The Road to Pro-Poor Growth in Zambia: Past Lessons and Future Challenges by Wobst, Peter & Thurlow, James
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Wobst, Peter; Thurlow, James
Conference Paper
The Road to Pro-Poor Growth in
Zambia: Past Lessons and Future
Challenges
Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Kiel 2005 / Verein für
Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics, No. 37
Provided in cooperation with:
Verein für Socialpolitik
Suggested citation: Wobst, Peter; Thurlow, James (2005) : The Road to Pro-Poor Growth
in Zambia: Past Lessons and Future Challenges, Proceedings of the German Development
Economics Conference, Kiel 2005 / Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development





The Road to Pro-Poor Growth in Zambia: 







James Thurlow and Peter Wobst 
 




















Paper submitted to the Department for International Development 





International Food Policy Research Institute 
2033 K Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20006 
 
Contacts: j.thurlow@cgiar.org and p.wobst@cgiar.org 
 Acknowledgements 
 
We thank the Department for International Development (DFID) for funding this research and for 
providing technical and logistical support during the project. We are grateful to Neil McCulloch 
from the Institute for Development Studies (IDS) at the University of Sussex for the providing us 
with the cleaned household surveys that helped us greatly with the poverty analysis. We thank the 
participants of seminars and workshops held at IFPRI, the World Bank, and the German Federal 
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). In particular we thank Manu 
Manthri and Christian Rogg (DFID), Derek Byerlee, Louise Cord, Lionel Demery and Ignacio 
Fiestas (World Bank), Robert Kappel (University of Leipzig), Helmut Asche (GTZ), and James 
Garret, Sherman Robinson and Xinshen Diao (IFPRI). Bingxin Yu, Benjamin Schraven, and 
Holger Seebens provided valuable research assistance. Finally, the views expressed in this paper 
are our own and do not necessary reflect those of IFPRI or any of the organizations involved in the 
project. 
  1Section I: Political Economy and Growth-Poverty Trends 
 
Zambia is one of the poorest countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.
1 However, in the 1960s it was a 
middle-income country believed to have considerable growth potential. The key to understanding 
the country’s economic history and its failure to develop lies in its natural resource endowments. 
Zambia is a land-abundant but sparsely-populated country in central Southern Africa. Agricultural 
potential is high due to considerable variation in rainfall patterns. However, like many other 
countries in the region, Zambia’s economy has been dominated by the discovery, expansion, and 
eventual decline of the minerals sector. Copper mining in particular has been central to the 
country’s development for almost a century, and the concentration of investment in this sector has 
generated one of the most urbanized populations in Africa.
2 Despite urbanization, a majority of the 
population lives in rural areas, which are often isolated from urban centers and rural markets.   
 
The establishment of the mining industry began when large copper deposits were discovered by 
British colonists during the late 1920s. Prior to this, Zambia was exploited as a source of revenue 
and labor for the wealthier southern colonies of South Africa and present-day Zimbabwe (Holmes, 
2004). The country’s rural areas were depopulated and distributed to white farmers, with little 
supporting investment in infrastructure. Given this economic vacuum, the rapid inflow of foreign 
investment in copper mining created a domestic migratory system that fostered urbanization, and 
concentrated economic activity and wealth within urban areas. Non-urban investment was directed 
towards transporting copper and capital goods between the small Copperbelt region and the 
southern border. The dominance of mining and urban political power, and the resulting rural-urban 
divide, still underpins Zambia’s development despite changes in the political control of the 
country. Over the last three decades Zambia has undergone five somewhat distinct policy regimes 
(World Bank, 2004). 
 
Interventionism and Failed Reform, 1965-1990 
 
The first policy regime began after Zambia gained independence in 1964. The newly-established 
government opted for what was essentially a market economy. However, mining and urban areas 
were favored through import substitution financed by growing copper exports (World Bank, 
1994). As a result of foreign investment in mining, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rose rapidly at 
5.1 percent per year during 1964-72 (see Table 1.1). Few people benefited from this growth 
however, particularly in rural areas (McCulloch et al., 2000). Accordingly, inequality, which was 
already high prior to independence, worsened over this decade.
3  
 
In the early 1970s the government broke from its market-driven policies, opting rather for state-
control. The urban-bias was further entrenched in 1972 when the copper mines were nationalized 
as part of the newly-adopted strategy based on the establishment and expansion of state-owned 
enterprises. The fast growth of the late 1960s ended when world copper prices fell sharply in the 
early 1970s. Export earnings were eroded, placing considerable pressure on the current account. 
The government, believing this negative terms-of-trade shock to be temporary, borrowed heavily 
to lessen the sharp decline in imported consumer and investment goods. Foreign debt mounted 
                                                 
1 Zambia is the sixth poorest Sub-Saharan country based on PPP-adjusted GDP per capita (World Bank, 2003a). 
2 The urban share of the population rose rapidly from 17 percent in 1960 to about 40 percent in 1980. For two decades 
this share has remained stable between 39 and 40 percent (World Bank, 2003a). 
3 The Gini coefficient was 0.48 in 1959 and 0.59 in 1974 (World Bank, 1994). 
  2rapidly while GDP growth dropped to 0.5 percent. Rather than initiate a process of structural 
adjustment and encourage diversification, the government chose to adopt regulatory policies. 
Subsidies and fixed consumer prices protected urban consumption, while the mining sector and 
state-owned manufacturing were favored through import-licensing and foreign exchange 
allocation. Growth remained unresponsive to this new interventionist strategy. In 1978 the 
government acknowledged the failure of its policies and implemented the country’s first structural 
adjustment program (SAP). Despite improved macroeconomic stability, political will was 
undermined and the reform process remained half-hearted (Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2000). 
By the mid-1980s subsidies comprised 20 percent of the fiscal budget, while price controls made 
many state enterprises unprofitable and in need of cross-subsidization (Osei-Hwedie, 2003; World 
Bank, 2003b).  
 
Table 1.1: Macroeconomic Performance and Social Outcomes in Zambia, 1964-72 
  1964-72 1973-84 1985-90 1991-98 1999-02 










Macroeconomic Indicators  Average annual percentage change 
    GDP (1995 LCU)  5.1 0.5 1.8 0.2  3.7
    GDP per capita (1995 LCU)  2.1 -2.6 -1.4 -2.4  1.9
    Exports (1995 $US)  3.4 -1.8 -3.4 4.3  6.5
    Imports (1995 $US)  8.0 -8.6 2.4 1.3  2.9
    Fixed capital formation (1995 LCU)  - -8.7 -1.0 6.3  11.0
    External debt (1995 $US)  - 10.8 14.8 0.9  -6.5
    Inflation (deflator)   6.9 11.4 67.8 71.7  23.9
    Exchange rate (LCU/$US)  0.0 9.0 69.4 76.2  24.9
    Real interest rate
* 9.5 -1.1 -25.4 0.9 13.4
Social Indicators  Average value for period 
    Life expectancy (years)
* 45.8 49.9 49.7 45.8 38.5
    Adult literacy (average percent)
* 48.7 56.7 65.7 72.7 77.3
    Infant mortality (per 1000 births)  111.8 96.3 103.7 111.3  112.0
Source: Own calculations using World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2003a). 
* 1964-72 average only covers 1970-71. 
 
Zambia entered a period of economic transition in the mid-1980s when the government attempted 
a second SAP aimed at correcting price distortions. However, while the program recognized the 
need for diversification (including into agriculture), it was again conditioned on the support of the 
ruling elite. When unrest in the urbanized Copperbelt province threatened mining revenues, which 
represented the government’s main source of income and political support, the government bowed 
to political and economic pressures by backtracking on reforms. A new set of interventions were 
announced, signaling a partial return to a command-style economy. Following some positive 
growth during the mid-1980s the economy entered a recession in 1989. Consequently, a third SAP 
was negotiated in which prices were decontrolled for all goods except maize and fertilizer. 
Although the program was far-reaching, it failed to achieve its objectives when the government 
again backtracked on reforms in order to win urban support in the run-up to the 1991 elections 
(Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2000). Maize and fertilizer reforms were halted, and the money 
supply was expanded to cover civil service wage-increases. Many donors withdrew support due to 
the government’s lack of commitment to economic reform.  
 
  3Figure 1.1. Real GDP and Population Growth, 1965-2001 
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Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2003a). 
 
The post-independence government lost political control of the country in 1991. Over three 
decades the government had maintained an economy that was heavily reliant on copper. State 
control of mining revenues and foreign exchange created a powerful ruling elite and oversized 
civil service who were dependent on the urbanized mining sector for political support.
4 
Accordingly, policies favored urban areas. Rural development policies took the form of price 
controls, which undermined diversification within agriculture and were partially motivated by 
urban consumption needs. The economy had been stagnating since the early 1970s, with failing 
opper exports and an unwillingness to diversify being the driving factors. Per capita incomes had  c
fallen almost consistently across the period, leading to high levels of poverty and substantial 
inequality (see Figure 1.1 and Table 1.2). Furthermore, by 1991 falling social spending from fiscal 
contraction had started to reverse the gains in social outcomes that had been achieved during the 
first decade after independence. 
 
Structural Adjustment, 1991-1998 
 
The current government won the country’s first free elections in 1991 based on a commitment to 
comprehensive  structural adjustment and the promise of more transparent and accountable 
governance (Bratton and Liatto-Katundu, 1994).
5 However the government inherited an unstable 
nd contracting economy with high poverty and inequality, a collapsing copper-dominated export 
sector, and massive foreign debt. The fourth SAP, which began immediately after the new 
government was elected, encompassed (i) macroeconomic stabilization; (ii) public sector reform; 
(iii) external liberalization; (iv) the privatization of state assets; and (v) agricultural reforms. 
                                                
a
 
4 See Bates and Collier (1993) and Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa (2000). 
5 The ‘current’ government refers to the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) government under the leadership 
of presidents Chilube (1991-2001) and Mwanawasa (2001-present). The ‘previous’ government was under Kuanda.  
  4Although these reforms hoped to stimulate growth and diversify the economy, GDP growth 
remained stagnant at 0.2 percent throughout the 1990s.  
 
(i) Inflation, which had soared during the final years of the post-independence government, 
averaged 127 percent between 1990-93. The exchange rate was depreciating equally rapidly, while 
real interest rates were large and negative. The government attempted to establish macroeconomic 
stability and by 1995 inflation had leveled at around 25 percent, a rate that would be maintained 
into the next decade. However, despite a more stable macroeconomic environment, sustained 
investment growth failed to materialize until after 1998. The positive overall investment growth 
for 1991-98 hides considerable variation caused by political and economic uncertainty.
6 in 2002, 
following four consecutive years of positive growth, the economy reached a level of real 
vestment last achieved in the mid-1980s. Despite the successfully implemented reforms of the 
opestake and Weston, 2000). However, the government failed to 
vercome its political dependence on urban public sector workers. Rather than reducing the 
 manufacturing employment fell rapidly 
McCulloch et al., 2000).  
ve tendering process, a 
otential buyer was identified in 2000. However, world copper prices fell 50 percent during this 
in
1990s, full macroeconomic stability has remained elusive (World Bank, 2003b). 
 
(ii) The government introduced a ‘cash budget system’ in 1993 as part of public sector reform. 
This limited the government to financing current expenditure out of existing revenues. Although 
countering past tendencies towards deficit-financing and inflationary monetary expansion, the 
government’s compliance to the new system has been somewhat mixed (Dinh et al., 2002). While 
revenue-raising policy-changes have been largely unsuccessful, the government’s expenditure cuts 
have been substantial (C
o
burden of the civil service, the government chose to reduce public investment and social spending. 
Social spending in particular had been declining throughout the previous two decades leading to 
deteriorating infant and adult mortality, and a strong urban-bias in education spending. This 
downward trend continued into the 1990s. 
 
(iii) External liberalization was achieved through extensive rationalization and lowering of trade 
protection. By 1996 the government removed all quantitative restrictions and licenses, and reduced 
the number of applied tariff rates. This made Zambia one of the most open economies in Africa 
(Rakner et al., 1999), and stands in stark contrast to earlier import-substitution industrialization. A 
large increase in imports was prevented by the continued depreciation of the exchange rate, which 
encouraged real export growth. However, inefficient state-owned enterprises did not respond 
positively to the removal of protection, and formal
(
 
(iv) Falling formal employment also resulted from the privatization of state assets. In 1990 over 
three quarters of formal GDP was generated by state-owned enterprises (Chanthunya and 
Murinde, 1998). Initially the privatization process was slow due to political opposition, but 
increased donor pressure accelerated the process. By 1997 over 80 percent of state enterprises had 
either been dissolved or sold to the private sector (Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2000). The sale 
of the main copper mining assets was delayed until mounting donor pressure forced the 
government to announce its sale in 1996. Despite a long and expensi
p
                                                 
6 Political uncertainty continued to undermine private investment despite the more stabilized economic environment 
of the mid-1990s. As evidence of this uncertainty, Chiluba’s government banned Kaunda from running for office in 
1995, and in 1997 there was an attempted coup d'état. Consequently, donors repeatedly threatened to withdraw 
financial support.  
  5interim period, thereby jeopardizing the sale and threatening a collapse of the sector (Lofgren et 
al., 2002). Donor support and improvements in copper prices have subsequently kept the mines 
operating, but these recent developments suggest that the role of copper as a source of foreign 
earnings is uncertain and limited (World Bank, 2004).  
 
(v) One of the key components of the recent reform package has been the liberalization of 
agricultural markets. The previous government favored maize production through pan-territorial 
pricing, input and output marketing assistance, and food subsidies in urban areas. In 1991 the new 
government attempted to eliminate food subsidies and reduce state involvement in the maize and 
fertilizer sectors. Resulting food-price increases were met with considerable opposition in urban 
areas (Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2000). Starting in 1992 the country suffered from a series of 
severe droughts, which eventually halted the reform process and caused the government to reenter 
the market. Despite these setbacks the reforms were completed by 1995.  
 
There are two other ‘policy-independent’ factors that have proven important for Zambia's 
development: foreign debt and HIV/AIDS (Lofgren et al., 2004). In 1991 Zambia owed more than 
ven billion dollars in foreign debt. Although 0.8 billion of this was written-off in 1993, the rate 
tor reform prevented the government’s engagement with the 
andemic. By the end of the 1990s 16 percent of the adult population were infected, with higher 
02b). Life expectancy and child mortality 
dicators worsened as a result (see Table 1.1). HIV/AIDS has underm
wering labor supply and productivity, raising household health-
 the sick and orphaned.
8 erability to po  
d through collapsing social capital. Offsetting social interventions in the areas of 
ation were prevented by deteriorating  government capa Increased mo
owered growth and raised poverty over the last decade, and 
ost serious threat to future develo t. 
uality estimates are only available for the 1990s.
9 Table 1.2 shows that the overall 
ambia was high at the start of the decade with a majority of the 
he nationally determined poverty line. The initial impact of structural 
s 
ough there 
                                                
se
of debt forgiveness slowed with the gradual deterioration of the policy environment during the 
late-1990s. Between 1991 and 2001 Zambia remained one of the most heavily indebted countries 
in the world.
7 The resulting debt servicing limited social expenditure during a period of fiscal 
contraction. In 2000 Zambia was classified as one of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
entitling it to a two-thirds debt reduction providing it adheres to the social objectives laid out in its 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) (Bigsten et al., 2001).  
 
One of the core PRSP objectives is addressing the rapidly growing problem of HIV/AIDS. Falling 
health expenditure under public sec
p
prevalence in urban areas (Republic of Zambia, 20
in ined growth and poverty-
reduction during the 1990s by lo
res, and increasing the burden of related expenditu  Vuln verty
has heightene
health and educ city.  rtality 
and morbidity have undoubtedly l
u (2000) remains the m according to Cher pmen
 
Poverty and ineq
incidence of poverty in Z
population falling below t
adjustment appears to have been negative, with poverty rising rapidly between 1991-1996. Thi
mirrors the sharp fall in GDP per capita during this period shown in Figure 1.1. Alth
was a subsequent decrease in poverty between 1996-1998, this was relatively small and was 
unable to reverse the overall upward trend of the 1990s. By contrast there was an overall decline in 
 
7 Zambia ranked 8
th in 1991 and 9
th in 2001 in terms of its ratio of per capita debt to per capita GDP (WDI, 2004). 
8 AIDS orphans in Zambia are estimated to number 650,000 or 6.5 percent of the population (PRSP, 2002). 
9 Although the most recent household survey is for 2002, this data has not yet been made available. 
  6the depth and severity of poverty during the 1990s. This suggests an improvement in the situation 
of the country’s poorest population. 
 
Table 1.2: Poverty and Inequality Trends, 1991-1998 
1991 1996  1998  
Basic poverty (upper poverty line)   
     Incidence (P0)  68.9 79.4  75.4
     Depth (P1)  41.7 45.4  40.0
     Severity (P2)  30.6 30.7  25.6
Extreme poverty (lower poverty line)   
     Incidence (P0)  56.5 65.8  59.8
     Depth (P1)  32.4 33.2  27.6
     Severity (P2)  23.2 20.8  16.2
Inequality (Gini coefficient)
  0.59 0.50 0.49
Source: Own calculations using Priority Survey (1991) and Living Conditions Monitoring Surveys (1996 and 1998). 
Note: Poverty for the various years is measured by real adult equivalent expenditure (see Appendix B).  
 
nequality fell dramatically during the early 1990s, and later stabilized I  between 1996 and 1998. 
w government has voiced 
terest in subsidizing agriculture, possibly indicting a return to pre-reform interventionism 
McGrath et al., 2002). Therefore two questions are of considerable importance: (i) has recent 
growth been in spite of or as a result of structural adjustment; and (ii) will the new post-adjustment 
growth path generate and sustain a broad-based alleviation of poverty? 
 
Subsequent sections in this paper explain the changing structure of growth and poverty, and the 
role of policies and external factors during the 1990s. However, this first section has described the 
initial political and economic context in which these policies and outcomes were implemented and 
achieved. Two policy-biases broadly summarize the policy-induced conditions present in Zambia 
at the start of structural adjustment. First, over three decades copper mining and Dutch Disease 
created a strong urban-bias
This is explained by the rising incidence and declining depth and severity of poverty. Thus despite 
stagnant growth during the structural adjustment period, increasing poverty and declining 
inequality suggests that substantial structural and distributional changes have been taking place.  
 
Renewed Growth, 1999-2002 
 
More recently there is evidence of renewed growth in Zambia. Between 1999-2002 GDP grew at 
an average rate of 3.4 percent per year. More importantly this positive growth has been sustained, 
which stands in stark contrast to the high variability of growth in previous decades. Figure 1.1 
indicates that economic growth has been sufficient to halt the decades-long decline in per capita 
GDP. However, while the economy has performed well, a number of political developments have 
been less positive. The reform process slowed considerably towards the end of the decade, 
especially in the run-up to the 2001 elections, in which the post-1991 government changed 
leadership. This recent democratic transition has since been marred by allegations of corruption 
odged at the outgoing government (Lodge, 2003). Furthermore, the ne l
in
(
  in government policies. The allocation of resources and social 
spending, and the protection of the civil service benefited the mining sector and politically strong 
urban population. Rural areas suffered from relative isolation caused by poor infrastructure 
investment and social spending. Secondly, the government adopted agricultural policies that 
  7favored urban areas b  maize-bias y supporting maize production and food prices. This  created a 
ependence on food subsidies within urban areas and a distorted structure of production within  d
rural areas. This further entrenched a bias against agricultural exports. As will be seen, the 
interaction of these policy-biases and the resilience of their political foundations have been critical 
in determining the impact of structural adjustment on pro-poor growth.  
 
 
  8Section II: Growth-Analysis and Poverty Profiles 
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DP of around ten percent meant that its contribution to growth remained low at 0.7 percent 
Section I, both were heavily subsidized and consumed a large portion of the government’s budget. 
Therefore pre-reform growth was unsustainable.  
 
 19  ave .8 pe er y ich 
was slower than population growth. Labor force growth and improvements in education were the
d
Bank, 2004). This was offset by declines in physical capital resulting from inadequate investment. 
The unstable political and economic environment of the late 1980s discouraged both private 
investment, while severe budget constraints undermined public investment (Mwanawina and 
Mulungushi, 2002). Accordingly, investment in fixed capital fell by an average 0.9 percent per 
year during 1985-1990 from an initially low GDP share of nine percent (Table 2.1).  
 
Stagnating public investment and poor world market conditions produced sluggish mining sector 
growth. During this period the mining sector relied heavily on the capital and infrastructure that 
had been accumulated during the early post-independence period (World Bank, 2004). In contrast 
to mining, the manufacturing sector grew rapidly during 1985-1990 at an average 7.5 percent per 
year. However, this sector’s focus on the domestic market did little to alleviate current account 
pressures resulting from falling real copper exports. Furthermore, manufactu
G
during the late 1980s. Agriculture also grew faster than overall GDP, contributing 0.4% to overall 
growth. On the demand side, growth was driven by private consumption spending and the 
stockpiling of inventories during the recession.  
 
The Zambian economy was therefore already in a period of decline before structural adjustment 
began in 1991. The mining sector was growing slowly with export earnings suffering as a result. 
Agricultural and manufacturing growth were the main growth sectors, although as discussed in 
  9Table 2.1. Growth Decomposition (1985-2001) 
   Growth rate  Contribution to growth 






renewed  economic  structural  renewed 
justment growth  transition  adjustment  growth 
GDP at factor cost  1.8 0.2 3.7 1.8  0.2  3.7
     Physical capital  -2.1 -1.2 0.5 -0.8  -0.5  0.2
     Human capital  3.8 4.9 3.2 2.3  2.7  2.0
     Total factor productivity  0.3 -1.9 1.4 0.3  -2.0  1.5
GDP at factor cost  1.8 0.2 3.7 1.8  0.2  3.7
     Agriculture  3.0 6.3 3.0 0.4  0.2  0.5
     Mining  1.3 -5.2 1.1 0.4  -0.3  0.2
     Manufacturing  7.5 0.9 3.5 0.7  0.0  0.4
     Services  0.7 2.3 5.2 0.3  0.2  2.6
Resource  demand  1.7 0.4 3.0 1.7 0.4 3.0
     Domestic demand  3.4 -0.6 2.0 2.1  -0.1  1.5
          Government  1.5 -1.5 1.2 0.1  -0.2  0.1
          Households  5.8 0.1 0.0 1.4  0.0  0.0
          Investment  -0.9 6.0 11.0 0.0  0.2  1.0
          Inventories  52.6 -142.4 24.4 0.7  -0.2  0.4
     External demand (exports)  -3.4 4.3 6.5   -0.4  0.5  1.5
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Development Indicators (World Bank 2003a) and World Bank (2004). 
 
During the structural adjustment period of 1991-1998 the government removed the trade 
protection that had shielded the manufacturing sector from foreign competition. The result was a 
substantial decline in manufacturing production. This contraction was exacerbated by a collapse of 
the mining sector, whose foreign earnings financed imported intermediates and investment goods 
for the heavily-subsidized state-owned enterprises. Erratic investment during the first half of the 
1990s could not keep pace with the depreciation of mining capital stock (McCulloch et al., 2000). 
Although investment grew after the mid-1990s, the fall in world copper prices caused a continuous 
ecline of mining exports at an average rate of 3.5 percent per year. Despite low profitability in 
ring the early 1990s, 
witched to positive rates in response to lower inflation rates during the mid-1990s. Although 
d
the mining sector, the government continued to subsidize state-owned mines to the detriment of 
other sectors.
10  By contrast, and in spite of a severe drought in 1992, agriculture grew strongly on 
average and contributed the most to economic growth. However, this was insufficient to offset the 
overall stagnation of the economy, which grew at a mere 0.2 percent per year. 
 
Much of the stagnation of GDP occurred during the first half of the 1990s.
11 Inflation averaged 
nearly a hundred percent for most of the late-1980s and early-1990s but was reduced and 
stabilized after 1995. Real interest rates, which were large and negative du
s
investment growth was highly erratic during this period, it did average six percent per year, thus 
reversing some of the decline of the late-1980s. The real effective exchange rate appreciated 
sharply at the end of the 1980s, reducing export competitiveness and foreign earnings, and 
                                                 
10 According to Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa (2000) the copper mines were costing the government one million 
dollars per day by 1998. This put considerable pressure on the budget and undermined the credibility of reforms. 
11 See Figures A2.1 and A2.2 in Appendix A. 
  10increasing foreign debt. However, macro-stabilization and more transparent foreign exchange 
management caused the exchange rate to gradually depreciate throughout most of the 1990s 
(McCulloch et al., 2000). This depreciation, together with an improving terms-of-trade, caused a 
resurgence of exports during 1991-1995. Agricultural exports became more important during this 
period, offsetting falling mining exports.  
 
Export growth maintained slightly positive real growth in total resource demand. However, 
domestic demand declined during 1991-1998, despite high investment growth, which had a low 
initial share of GDP. Government demand contracted during the 1990s, largely as a result of 
fiscal-restraint within broader macro-stabilization policies. However, high government 
expenditure on state-owned enterprises and public administration (especially the public wage bill) 
ensured that government demand remained over 20 percent of GDP. Real household consumption 
remained constant during the 1990s, increasing at an average of only 0.1 percent per year. This 
mall increase in consumption was outweighed by population growth, leading to falling aggregate 
 
s
per capita consumption and raising poverty. 
 
A resurgence of exports generated approximately half of the renewed growth experienced during 
1999-2001. Overall, exports grew at an annual rate of 6.5 percent, with a vast majority of this 
coming from the mining sector. Although agricultural exports have continued to grow, they 
declined in relative importance, possibly as a result of an appreciating real exchange rate and 
dverse weather conditions. Manufacturing also experienced a recovery, with an average annual 
omestic demand in recent years. However, 
’s translation into physical capital growth has been more modest. Although physical capital’s 
The decomposition of Zambia’s economic structure and growth leading up to the 1990s clearly 
reflects the urban-bias identified in the previous section. Revenues from the dominant mining 
sector were being used to cross-subsidize inefficient state-owned enterprises, creating a large civil 
service and public sector that was dependent on urban-based state-owned industries. Furthermore, 
these industries, which accounted for around three-quarters of GDP in 1991, crowded-out private 
investment (McCulloch et al., 2000). However, falling world prices in the 1980s created a 
downward spiral in which declining export earnings reduced the ability of the government to 
a
growth rate of 3.5 percent. This sector has benefited from the recent and sustained increase in 
investment, which accounts for the remaining half of economic growth. While the manufacturing 
and other non-mining industries’ share in total GDP increased slightly, their contribution to total 
export earnings has been more significant. Despite improvements in the industrial sectors, it has 
been services that have contributed the most to GDP growth in recent years. However, while there 
has been some growth in informal trade, it has not been the private sector that has been the driving 
force. Rather it has been public sector services that have been the main contributor. Real wages 
remain substantially higher in the public sector, and civil service reform has been largely 
unsuccessful (Duncan et al. 2003). Consequently, the service sector grew while the bulk of the 
service economy stagnated or declined. 
 
Investment has been the fastest growing component of d
it
contribution to GDP became positive during 1999-2001, it remained low at 0.2 percentage points. 
By contrast, the most significant change since 1998 has been the high positive growth of total 
factor productivity (TFP). TFP had previously been falling due to a reliance of imported 
technological change, and declining manufactured imports caused by the contraction of copper 
earnings (World Bank, 2004). However, in more recent years this trend has been reversed, 
possibly through renewed growth in imports and private sector investment.  
 
  11import investment goods and maintain the level of public investment. This undermined 
productivity within the import- and investment-intensive mining and manufacturing sectors, which 
further reduced exports and increased the need for cross-subsidization. During structural 
adjustment, the government was forced to contract public expenditures in an attempt to control 
inflation and limit foreign borrowing. Growth in private investment and physical capital remained 
w during the 1990s, reflecting the significant political and economic uncertainty of this period. 
d itself, relieving some of the 
as against non-mining exports. Agriculture in particular responded  ias 
was removed and the sector diversified. Macro-economic stabilization encouraged sustained and 
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 appears that str l adjus t has  red re ed and   dive d gro
maining sections of this paper are concerned with how structural adjustme d the 
th path affe overty inequ  
verty Profiles, 1991-1998 
erty and ineq  measures from Section I suggested tha ifican tributi
ce during  -1998.  ite obvious interest in the growth period of 1999-2002, 
pleted household survey is not y ilable erefore t ection onfined
nd inequality evolved during the structural adjustment period. 
s the incide and sev  of poverty across a number of dimensions.
12 Poverty 
gh in 1991, with 68.9 pe th ulatio ling be he nat -def
. Rural poverty  much er tha an po . Arou  percent of the rural 
n 1991 was p accounting for approximate 0 perce f the  try’s 
y contrast, 4 rcent of the urban population was poor. High and severe rural 
e long-sta ng urba s of government cies and prolo negle
ational pove se duri e 199 ut the erience ural a rban a
ly different. W  urban a exper  sharp eases in incide f pov
specially during 1991-1996, poverty in the rural areas fell slightly, despite a small initial rise. 
f poverty are even more divergent. The severity of urban poverty rose 
e 1990s, while it f ramatically in rural areas. These trends offset each other to produce 
able but rising  rty at the national level. 
13
ds. By contrast, poverty amongst non-farm rural households has risen 
lo
Exports rebounded slightly as the overvalued exchange rate correcte
bi positively, as the maize-b
po invest ally r  prod y and omic  th. It 
therefore uctura tmen foste new more rsifie wth. 
The re nt an new 
emerging grow cted p  and  ality. 
 
 Po Inequality and
 





an assessment of how poverty a





was already rcent of  e pop n fal low t ionally ined 
poverty line
 i
 was  high n urb verty nd 88
n population oor,  ly 7 t o coun poor 
population. B 6 pe
poverty reflects th ndi n-bia  poli  the  nged  ct of 
rural areas. N rty ro ng th 0s, b  exp s of r nd u reas 
were marked hile reas  ience  incr  the  nce o erty, 
e
Trends in the severity o
during th ell d
relatively st pove
 
The overall decline in rural poverty has been driven by falling poverty amongst the small-scale 
farm population, and to a lesser extent, amongst medium-scale farm households.  The severity of 
poverty has fallen for both household groups, although it is small-scale farmers that mainly drive 
verall rural tren o
dramatically by ten percentage points during 1991-1998, with the severity of poverty also rising, 
albeit much more slowly. Therefore there appears to be two trends taking place within rural areas 
during the structural adjustment period. Farm households, especially small-scale, appeared to be 
                                                 
12 The incidence of poverty is measured by the poverty headcount (P0), which is the percentage of the population 
falling below the poverty line (see Appendix B). The headcount index attaches the same weight to all people 
regardless of how far from the poverty line they are. The severity of poverty is measured by the squared poverty gap 
(P2), which attaches a greater weight to those people falling further below the poverty line.  
13 Small-scale households have less than five hectares of land and five dairy cattle; medium-scale households have a 
maximum of 20 hectares of land, 20 dairy cattle, and 50 beef cattle; large-scale are all other farm households. Non-
farm households are non-agricultural and have none of the above assets. 
  12better off at the end of the decade than they were in 1991, while the reverse is true for non-farm 
households.
14 The increase in poverty within urban areas is driven by increased poverty amongst 
ouseholds in low and medium-cost areas, although it was only in the former that the severity of  h
poverty increased substantially.
15 High-cost households experienced an initial increase in poverty, 
but an overall decline for the 1990s with some improvement in their severity of poverty. 
 
Table 2.2. Poverty Profile (1991, 1996, 1998) (Upper Poverty Line) 






1991 1996 1998 1991 1996 1998
National  100.0 68.9 79.4 75.4 30.6 30.7 25.6
67.0 12.1 18.0 18.2
42.4 29.2
31.4
   Lusaka  16.1 1.3
   Northern  12.6 83.6 90.8 5.0 .6
-Western  5.2 77.8 89.0 6.0 .2
thern  11.9 78.4 86.1 8.4 .9
tern  7.8 84.5 89.2 0.3 .6
Rural
1 54.6 88.0 90.1 85.6 47.9 40.3 33.3
      Small-scale  48.0 89.8 91.2 86.4 50.1 41.5 33.7
      Medium-scale  2.7 81.6 77.6 80.3 36.0 27.1 27.7
      Non-farm  3.7 70.9 83.4 80.9 29.7 31.9 32.2
Urban
2 45.4 46.0 61.2 58.3 9.7 14.2 12.7
      Low-cost  24.0 53.1 66.3 64.3 11.4 16.2 14.9
      Medium-cost  14.9 39.5 47.4 50.1 8.1 8.5 8.3
      High-cost  6.5 34.6 39.9 33.0 6.9 6.4 4.8
Province 
      Central  9.1 69.8 84.1 78.9 25.9 31.5 29.3
    Copperbelt  15.0 55.5 70.8   
      Eastern  12.8 84.3 89.0 82.7 46.4
      Luapula  9.5 83.9 88.4 85.4 39.8 34.5
6.6 11.7     31.0 5 54.4
8
12.5
31.3     41 41.8
      North 7 36 35.8 24.9
      Sou 7 40 35.3 29.5
      Wes 9 46 44.3 37.5
 
ender of household head  G
      Male  85.7 67.9 78.9 74.9 29.2 29.7 24.7
      Female  14.3 74.9 81.6 77.2 38.4 34.7 29.2
Source: Own calculations using Priority Survey (1991) and Living Conditions Monitoring Surveys (1996 and 1998). 
1. A rural large-scale category is also included in the surveys but only represents 0.2% of the total 1991 population. It 
is excluded from the table since its small sample size makes its estimates unreliable. 
2. The urban population share is larger in the 1991 survey than that reported in the World Development Indicators 
(World Bank, 2003). 
 
Provincial poverty trends are largely determined by the degree of urbanization within each 
rovince. The more urbanized Lusaka, Copperbelt and Central provinces experienced sharp 
                                                
p
increases in poverty, while the more rural provinces experienced only slight increases or 
decreases.
16 The only exception is the Western province, which, despite being largely rural and 
already the poorest province in 1991, experienced a consistent increase in the incidence of poverty 
 
14 Section III explores the role of migration and shifting population shares.  
15 Urban households were stratified according to the type of housing of in the area, determined by housing standards 
defined by local government councils. These comprised low, medium and high cost housing areas.  
16 See Figure A3.1 for the location of Zambian provinces. 
  13throughout the 1991-1998 period. However, the severity of poverty did fall in the Western 
province during the structural adjustment period as in all other rural provinces.  
 
In 1991 a higher share of the population within female-head households fell below the poverty line 
able 2.3 shows the changes in inequality across the 1990s. Inequality, as measured by the Gini 
64. However, the combinati ine, rising p lling 
verity of poverty suggest  ual  ha ed d e s adj
his is confirmed by the falling Gini coefficient and Theil mean log deviation measure 
8. Falling inequality is m ronoun ral  s, which minates
ure. Urban inequali  falling pite ris overty in low-cost areas and falling 
st areas. This ests th ese ineq ty trends are dominated by changes 
 the tail-ends of th stributio his is  reflected in the changing severity of 
y in Table 2.2, and in the larger changes in the Theil measure, both of which are more 
es taking place in the ta
l, Rural and Ur Inequality Measures (1991, 1996, 1998) 
ini coeffi t  Theil mean log deviation 
than within male-headed households. However, during the 1990s this gap narrowed as poverty 
within male-headed households rose more rapidly than in female-headed households. By 1998 the 
incidence of poverty within these two household groups was relatively similar. The changing 
incidence amongst male and female-headed households appears to mirror the rural-urban divide. 
Female-headed households are mostly situated in rural areas being mainly engaged in agriculture 
with relatively little involvement in wage-earning jobs in manufacturing and industries. 
 
T
coefficient, was the same in 1991 as it was in 1974 and higher than at the time of independence in 
19 on of a high poverty l overty headcount, and fa
se that ineq ity must ve declin uring th tructural  ustment 
period. T
between 1991-199 ore p ced in ru area  do  the 
national meas ty is  des ing p
poverty in high-co  sugg at th uali
taking place in e di n. T also 
povert
sensitive to chang  with ils.  
 
Table 2.3. Nationa ban 
   G cien
   1991 1996 1998 1991 1996 1998
National 0.59 0.50 0.49 0 0
0 0
.78 .46 0.42
Rural 0.62 0.48 0.48 .85 .40 0.41
Urban 0.47 0.44 0.43 0.40 0.34 0.32
Source: Own calculations using Priority  ey (1991) ing Co ns Monit  Surveys   and 1998
he poverty and inequality estimates suggest that different groups within the population have had 
o far this section has reviewed the growth path of Zambia over the last two decades and 
identified the key changes in poverty and inequality taking place during the 1990s. The remainder 
of this section uses three methods to determine whether growth during the structural adjustment 
Surv  and Liv nditio oring (1996 ). 
 
T
very different experiences during the structural adjustment period. Urban poverty has risen while 
rural poverty has fallen. Within urban areas the rise in poverty is concentrated within low-cost 
areas. Small and medium-scale rural households have seen dramatic declines in poverty, while 
non-farm rural households suffered considerably during the 1990s. These rural-urban trends have 
dominated provincial and gender-based poverty outcomes.  
 
Pro-Poor Growth, 1991-1998 
 
S
  14period was ‘pro-poor’.
17 These include (i) poverty decompositions; (ii) growth-poverty and 
inequality-poverty elasticities; and (iii) growth incidence curves. Section III then links policies to 
these pro-poor growth outcomes. 
 
The national poverty decomposition for 1991-1998, shown in Table 2.4, suggests that declining 
growth was the main contributing factor to the rising incidence of poverty, while the effect of 
falling inequality (from Table 2.3) on distribution played a dampening role. This dominant 
growth-effect is consistent across the 1990s, and accounts for most of the increasing poverty-
incidence during 1991-1996 and its fall during 1996-1998. However, while improved inequality 
lowered poverty early in the decade, it exacerbated it in later years by pulling more of the non-
poor over the poverty line.  
 
Table 2.4. Poverty Decompositions (1991, 1996, 1998) (Upper Poverty Line) 
   Headcount poverty (P0)  Squared poverty gap (P2) 
   1991-98 1991-96 1996-98 1991-98 1991-96 1996-98
National 
     Overall change  6.4 10.3 -3.8 -5.0 0.0 -5.0
          Growth  5.9 9.8 -4.4 4.0 7.0 -3.5
          Distribution   -0.4 -0.5 0.8 -9.8 -8.2 -1.3
        Residual  0.9 1.0 -0.2 0.8 1.2 -0.1
  Overall change 
       Growth 
-
        Growth  15.2 16.8 -1.9 5.6 6.4 -0.8
  
Rural 
    -2.4 2.0 -4.3
-5.1
-14.6 -7.7 -6.9
-7.2     -3.3 1.3 -4.5 1.4
          Distribution   1.8 0.8 1.0 -9.1 -9.5 0.4
          Residual  -0.9 0.0 -0.2 -1.1 0.3 0.2
Urban 
     Overall change  12.3 15.1 -2.9 3.0 4.5 -1.5
  
          Distribution   -3.8 -2.2 -1.1 -2.2 -1.6 -0.8
          Residual  0.9 0.5 0.2 -0.4 -0.2 0.0
Source: Own calculations using Priority Survey (1991) and Living Conditions Monitoring Surveys (1996 and 1998). 
 
The dominance of the growth-effect on the national incidence of poverty does not extend to the 
severity of poverty. Amongst the poorest households, improvements in inequality have proven 
more important in reducing severe poverty. This distribution-effect reduced severe poverty 
throughout the 1990s. Therefore under the relative definition of pro-poor growth (McCulloch et 
l., 2000), the positive distribution-effect indicates that the 1990s have been a period of pro-poor  a
growth, especially for those people suffering from severe poverty. However, poverty rose during 
1991-1998 despite the positive distribution-effect, thus challenging the appropriateness of this 
definition. 
 
                                                 
17 There are two definitions of ‘pro-poor growth’. Under the absolute definition growth can only be ‘pro-poor’ if the 
poor experience an absolute increase in real per capita consumption (Ravallion, 2004). Under the relative definition, 
pro-poor growth exists if there is a positive distribution-effect on changing poverty (McCulloch et al., 2000). By this 
definition growth can be ‘pro-poor’ if the poor are worse-off in absolute terms but better-off  in relative terms (i.e., 
real per capita consumption falls for all households but falls faster for the non-poor).  
  15The decomposition of changes in poverty-incidence within rural areas indicates that the growth-
effect outweighed the distribution-effect throughout the 1990s. More importantly however is the 
negative effect that reduced inequality had on the poverty headcount - by pulling more of the non-
poor across the poverty line.
18 However, this perverse distribution-effect was offset by a positive 
growth-effect leading to an overall decline in poverty during 1991-1998. As would be expected for 
measures more sensitive to the tail-ends of the distribution, the distributional effect of falling 
inequality was to lower the overall severity of poverty during the structural adjustment period. 
However, 1991-1998 comprises two distinct periods. Severe poverty declined in both periods, 
although during 1991-1996 this decline was dominated by the distribution-effect while during 
1996-1998 it was the growth-effect that dominated. By contrast, in urban areas the growth-effect 
always dominated the distribution-effect, while improvements in urban inequality reduced both 
e incidence and severity of poverty. 
Table 2.5 shows the poverty-growth and poverty-inequality elasticities
th
 
 for the structural 
adjustment period. Increasing growth by one percent reduces the incidence of poverty by 0.5 
percent in 1991. There was little change in this elasticity across the 1990s. By contrast, adjusting 
inequality has a small effect on the incidence of poverty.
19 In 1996 and 1998 the poverty-
inequality elasticity indicates that reducing inequality would be detrimental to poverty. Again, this 
is because reducing inequality is achieved by pulling the non-poor over the poverty line.  
 
Table 2.5. Growth- and Inequality-Poverty Elasticities (1991, 1996, 1998) (Upper Poverty Line) 
   Poverty-growth elasticities  Poverty-inequality elasticities 
   1991 1996 1998 1991 1996 1998
Headcount poverty (P0)  -0.5 -0.4 -0.5 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Poverty gap (P1)  -0.7 -0.8 -0.9 1.1 0.6 0.8
Squared poverty gap (P2)  -0.7 -1.0 -1.1 2.1 1.3 1.6
Source: Own calculations using Priority Survey (1991) and Living Conditions Monitoring Surveys (1996 and 1998). 
 
The greater the weight attached to poverty amongst the poorest of the population, the greater the 
influence of both growth and inequality in reducing that poverty. The elasticities on the poverty 
gap and squared poverty gap are larger than on the poverty headcount for both growth and 
inequality. Furthermore, the ability of growth to reduce deeper and more severe poverty increased 
 
le stimulating growth is better at reducing the incidence of poverty. 
over the 1990s. The reverse appears to be true for inequality, whose elasticities have generally
declined across the period. The relative magnitudes of these two sets of elasticities are consistent 
across the period, and suggest that improving inequality is better at reducing the severity of 
poverty, whi
 
Figure 2.1 shows the growth incidence curve (GIC) for 1991-1998. A GIC reflects average annual 
real consumption growth for each percentile of the population ranked according to per capita 
consumption. Mean consumption growth for the population as a whole was only slightly positive 
during the structural adjustment period. However, this aggregate figure hides the considerable 
differences between the upper and lower ends of the population. The poorest of the population (on 
the left-hand side of the figure) experienced positive annual growth in consumption during the 
                                                   
18 This seemingly perverse effect, in which reducing inequality raises poverty, is somewhat to be e
areas’ initial combination of very high poverty and inequality. 
xpected given rural 
19 These elasticities are measured at the margin and are therefore strictly applicable only for small changes in growth 
and inequality. 
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Source: Own calculations using Priority Survey (1991) and Living Conditions Monitoring Surveys (1996 and 1998). 
Note: The national growth incidence curve is not strictly decomposable into rural and urban curves due to changes in 
rural and urban population shares (see Section III). Lowest end of the distribution for both years is truncated (see 
Appendix B). 
 
Table 2.6 shows the pro-poor growth rates derived from the GICs (Ravallion and Chen, 2003). 
  Based on the absolute definition, the pro-poor growth rate is the average annual growth rate of real
per capita consumption for each percentile of the population falling below the poverty line.
20 
Zambia experienced pro-poor growth of 1.1 percent per year during 1991-1998. This growth was 
driven by rural areas which outweighed declines in urban areas. Furthermore, pro-poor growth 
during the first half of the decade was negative, a trend that was reversed in later years. This 
reversal occurred in both rural and urban areas.  
 
Table 2.6. Pro-Poor Growth Rates (1991-1998) (Upper and Lower Poverty Lines) 
                                                 
20  This is the mean of consumption growth of the poor, as opposed to the growth of mean consumption of the poor. 
  17   Average annual pro-poor growth rate (%)
1
   1991-98 1991-96 1996-98
National 1.1 -1.1 2.2
     Rural  4.0 1.3 2.7
     Urban  -1.8 -2.7 0.9
     Central  -2.3 -2.4 0.4
     Copperbelt  -3.5 -3.3 -0.1
     Eastern  5.7 0.0 5.6
     Luapula  2.4 1.5 0.9
     Lusaka  -4.2 -3.8 -0.5
     Northern  4.1 -0.2 4.2
     North-Western  2.6 -1.7 4.4
     Southern  1.3 -1.2 2.5
     Western  1.1 -1.2 2.3
Source: Own calculations using Priority Survey (1991) and Living Conditions Monitoring Surveys (1996 and 1998). 
Note: Pro-poor growth rates are not strictly decomposable across sub-periods due to changes in rural and urban 
population shares (see Section III). Lower end of the distribution are dropped for both years (see Appendix B). 
Following the rural-urban divide, the pro-poor growth rates of the predominantly rural provinces 
were positive, while growth rates in the more urbanized Copperbelt, Central and Lusaka provinces 
were negative. Much of the negative pro-poor growth in both the urban and rural provinces 
occurred during the first half of the decade. There was particularly strong pro-poor growth during 
1996-1998 in the Eastern and Northern provinces, although all rural provinces, with the exception 
of Luapula province, experienced strong pro-poor growth. Figure A2.3 in the Appendix shows the 
GICs for the nine provinces during 1991-1998. The curves for all three of the urbanized provinces 
fall below zero, while those of the Eastern and Northern provinces lie above the national GIC. 
These curves indicate that over and above the rural-urban divide, there have also been significant 
provincial/spatial differences in pro-poor growth.  
 
The structure and decomposition of growth leading up to and including the structural adjustment 
period reflect the way in which mining and the urban-bias of government policies had distorted the 
economy. Almost all export earnings in 1991 were generated by copper and used to finance 
import-intensive public investment and the civil service. Public investment remained critical since 
state-enterprises effectively crowded-out private investment, and were unable to efficiently 
displace imported investment goods. Poor competitiveness and inadequate investment meant that 
productivity growth was low and often negative during the two decades prior to 1991. This 
distorted structure and poor economic performance lead to high and severe poverty in 1991. 
Furthermore, the strong urban-bias was reflected in the exceptionally high rural poverty rates. 
 
Structural adjustment during 1991-1998 had a profound effect on the Zambian economy. Macro-
stabilization did not immediately encourage private investment, and the manufacturing and mining 
sectors declined dramatically under economic instability, trade liberalization, and privatization. 
Correction of the over-valued real exchange rate and the removal of the bias against agricultural 
exports meant that agriculture and agricultural exports grew rapidly, and to some extent replaced 
declining mining exports. Urban poverty rose rapidly during this period, especially within low-
cost areas. Rural agricultural households’ poverty fell in line with the fast growth in the 
agricultural sector. Rural non-farm households experienced rising poverty. In both regions there 
was a decline in inequality, although in rural areas this had the effect of pulling more households 
 
  18below the poverty  earlier negative 
rowth, ultimately leading to pro-poor growth across the structural adjustment period. This high 
th in Zambia and the trade-offs between alternative 
evelopment paths. However, in an attempt to better understand the factors that have influenced 
 line. Positive pro-poor growth later in the decade outweighed
g
pro-poor growth was driven by a rapid rise in per capita consumption at the lower end of the 
distribution. These findings suggests that it was only the urban-based core that collapsed under 
structural adjustment and pulled down aggregate GDP growth to only 0.2 percent per year. This 
aggregate measure conceals the agricultural growth that was taking place in rural areas, and the 
fact that increased poverty was largely concentrated within main urban centers. Agriculture 
responded positively during the adjustment period to the removal of past policy-biases.  
 
There is evidence of renewed growth in recent years, although no recent estimates of poverty are 
currently available. However, the resurgence of mining and public sector growth raises concerns 
over trade-offs between agriculture-led rural growth and urban-based industrial growth, and with 
the role of government policies in addressing such trade-offs. Sections IV and V consider the 
future prospects for accelerating pro-poor grow
d
poor people’s participation in the growth process, the next section investigates in more detail the 
role of policies in generating the pro-poor outcomes of the 1990s.   
 
  19Section III: Factors Affecting the Participation of the Poor  
 
Zambia recently underwent a substantial shift in its growth path and this changing pattern of 
have dominated more forward-looking policies in shaping 
e economic environment and poverty outcomes of the 1990s. These broad-based structural 
uded macro-stabilization, trade liberalization, 
privatization, public sector reform, and agricultural liberalization. As outlined in Section I, these 
irect response to the long-standing policies that were adopted soon after 
 over the last decade, thus suggesting that this 
  ortfalls on the current account 
nd reserve 
ed, and efforts wer McCulloch 
et al., 2000). The latter was an important reform since the previous system of import licensing and 
exchange rationing generated substantial rent-seeking and a concentration of economic power 
within state-owned urban-based industries (Bigsten and Kiwizzi-Mugerwa, 2000). Furthermore, 
government control of scarce foreign exchange constrained import-intensive private sector 
                                                
growth has impacted differently on different areas and groups within the country. The challenge is 
to identify the role played by policies, external factors, and initial conditions in generating these 
outcomes. This task is complicated by the scale of the structural adjustment program and the series 
of external shocks that disrupted the economy during the 1990s. As described in Section II, 
Zambia’s economy was generally in recession during the first half of the decade, with signs of 
growth only beginning to emerge after 1998. Therefore, in attempting to identify which policies 
and initial conditions contributed or constrained pro-poor growth, it is difficult to separate reform-
based policies, which were aimed at correcting past distortions and avoiding crisis, from other 
policies which are more directly aimed at and typically associated with generating growth and 
poverty-reduction. In many respects this section can only explain why certain households coped 
better than others under structural adjustment. 
 
Structural reforms and external shocks 
th
reforms, which form the focus of this section, incl
reforms were in d
independence and which had, by beginning of the 1990s, produced a pronounced division between 
rural and urban areas. The poverty profiles of the previous section revealed that rural and urban 
reas have had markedly different experiences a
division is the dominant ‘initial condition’ on which the outcomes of the reforms have largely 
been determined. This section follows the rural/urban distinction by first assessing the macro, 
structural, and labor market policies that largely affected urban areas, before turning to a review of 
agricultural reforms and their impact on rural development. Zambia’s political economy is 
considered throughout. Although past policies effectively limited the linkages between rural and 
urban areas, the effects of key inter-regional linkages that have emerged during reform are also 
considered. 
 
Macroeconomic Policies and Stabilization 
 
In response to declining revenues throughout the 1980s the government adopted expansionary 
monetary policy to cover public sector wages and the losses accruing from state enterprises. 
Accordingly the inflation rate rose rapidly towards the end of the decade and into the early 1990s, 
where it reached a maximum of 180 percent in 1993.
21 Despite increases in the money supply, the 
overnment continued running a large deficit, while persistent sh g
escalated foreign debt. The new government acknowledged this untenable situation and 
immediately implemented a comprehensive stabilization program in 1991. Credit a
ceilings were remov e made to liberalize foreign exchange markets (
 
21 See Table 1.1 in Section I. 
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 been in place since the 1980s and together with other agricultural subsidies had become 
 substantial drain on the fiscal budget. 
h high inflation, c eterioratin al stoc
a th (World k, 2004).  
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Source: CSO (1999b) 
Note: Urban includes Livingstone, Lusaka (urban), Kabwe (urban), and all Copperbelt towns; Rural includes other 
small towns and all rural areas; Food includes food, beverages, and tobacco. Urban (low) refers to low income urban 
areas, whereas Urban (high) refers to high income areas. 
 
he previous section identified a substantial increase in urban poverty during T  1991-1996, which 
later stabilized by 1998. This outcome was partly driven by the initial rise and subsequent 
leveling-off of food prices during this period. However, while inflation lowered real incomes and 
consumption for all urban households, its effect was more pronounced on low and medium-cost 
urban areas. These urban households have higher food shares in their consumption basket, while at 
the same time consume larger shares of domestically produced commodities. This is confirmed in 
Figure 3.1, which shows that low-income metropolitan households experienced a much larger rise 
in marketed food prices during the early 1990s relative to other households. Furthermore, Table 
  213.1 shows that purchased food accounted for a larger share of their total expenditure.
22 Within 
rural areas, non-farm households experienced the greatest rise in poverty due in part to the lower 
share of own produced food in their consumption bundle relative to other rural households. 
Therefore, participation in the market economy, which is usually associated with economic 
development, made these households more vulnerable to macro-economic instability and later
23
, the 
reatest beneficiaries of the successful macroeconomic policies.   
.1. Household Con n and conom
Household category  household expenditures 
g
 
Table 3 sumption Shares by Locatio
Share of total 
 E ic Stratum (1998) 
(percentage) 
 Food  expenditures 
 Produced  rchased  food 
Non
penditure xpendit Pu Total 
-food 
ex s  e
Total 
ures 
Rural 53.8  20.7  74.5  25.5  100.0 
.2  20.9  77.1  22.9  100.0 
-scale  .8  16.5  63.3  36.7  100.0 
.3  4.0  58.3  41.7  100.0 
.8  32.9  66.6  33.4  100.0 
.5  38.7  47.2  52.8  100.0 
.4  41.8  51.2  48.8  100.0 
st  .3  37.9  47.2  52.8  100.0 
st  .6  31.8  37.4  62.6  100.0 
.0  30.2  60.2  39.8  100.0 
     Small-scale  56
     Medium 46
     Large-scale  54
     Non-farm  33
Urban 8
     Low-cost 
dium-co
9
     Me 9
     High-co 5
All households  30
Source: Own calculations using L onditio nitoring S  (1998). 
oduced includes own p  food a  receiv ot paid for; p ed inclu od purch
  
ntial trade protection was also 
iving C ns Mo urvey
Note: pr roduced nd food ed but n urchas des fo ased 
for cash.
 
Although macroeconomic policies directly affected the poor through consumer prices, and 
directly through the supply of credit and investment funds, the main drivers of instability during  in
the 1990s were external shocks. Zambia suffered from a series of droughts that undermined 
agricultural production throughout the decade, and world copper prices fluctuated considerably 
along a negative long-run trend (Lofgren et al., 2002). The resulting volatility in the exchange rate 
and production created an environment prone to crisis and ill-suited to investment. This lack of 
private sector participation and investment greatly jeopardized the success of structural reforms.  
 
Structural Reforms, Labor Markets and Migration 
 
The structure of the Zambian economy reflects both the inward-industrialization strategy adopted 
during the 1970s, and the persistent urban-bias of government policies. Originally copper revenues 
had been at least partly directed towards pro-poor spending, leading to significant gains in social 
outcomes (Bigsten and Kiwizzi-Mugerwa, 2000).
24 However, the government redirected public 
unds to nationalizing and establishing state enterprises. Substa f
                                                 
22 The data on household consumption share 991 survey imputed 
ousehold own consumption s not co quall e M et al., 2 owe
composition of food expe kely to anged over the 1990s, ly given agricultural reforms, it is 
hare o ood in otal ex nditu s will  ve ch ed gr tly.  
lds benefited more fr  infl ion-tar ing  po cies t rural house olds si wh e all 
households suffered from contractionary fiscal and monetary policies, market-integrated urban households are likely 
to have benefited more from the resulting stable market prices. 
24 See Table 1.2 in Section I. 
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relatively low returns, with few opportunities for generating em
However, despite its drain on the fiscal budget, the sector represented an important source of
come for many households, especially within larger urban centers. In 1991, for example,  in
households employed in manufacturing constituted around 15 percent of the total population in the 
more urbanized Lusaka and Copperbelt Provinces.
25 These sectors also have strong linkages with 
the rest of the economy, thus indirectly contributing to total employment (Evans et al., 2004). 
 
Table 3.2. Formal Employment by Sector (1986-2000) 
Sector  Average share of total formal 
employment (percentage) 
  Average annual growth rate 
(percentage) 
  1986-90 1991-96  1996-1998    1986-90 1991-96  1996-1998 
Agriculture 14.9  14.9 12.5 0.2 -2.4  -3.2
Mining 12.1  10.9 8.3 0.1 -4.8  -7.3
Manufacturing 14.2  12.2 9.9 0.1 -7.6  0.2
     Food   4.9  3.9 1.4 0.0 -9.7  -3.8
     Textiles/clothing  2.5  2.0 0.7 0.3 -10.2  -4.5
     Metal/mineral   2.2  1.9 0.8 -0.7 -6.8  0.5
   Other  4.6  4.4 2.1    0.5 -4.8  2.4
Energy 1.3  1.2 1.1 2.8 -6.5  3.7
Construction 7.1  4.0 3.0 -3.2 -12.3  3.1
Trade 8.8  6.9 10.6 -3.3 6.9  2.8
Transport 6.8  9.0 9.7 13.3 -5.3  5.4
Financial services  6.0  7.4 7.3 1.4 2.9  -4.3
Public services  28.8  33.4 37.6 1.5 1.7  1.3
Total 100.0  100.0 100.0 0.8 -2.0  -0.1
Source: CSO (2002) for broad sectors; various sources cited in Szirmai et al. (2002) for within-manufacturing. 
Note: Only includes workers paid a wage and working for establishments listed in the CSO list of formal 
establishments. Results are consistent with those in the 1991 PS and 1998 LCMS surveys. 
 
Beyond trade liberalization, the new government embarked on a program of privatization. Initially 
there was considerable opposition, which stalled the privatization process throughout the early 
1990s. However, increased donor pressure forced the government to accelerate the process such 
that by 1997 over three-quarters of state enterprises had been sold or discontinued (Bigsten and 
                                                 
25 See Table A3.1 in Appendix A. 
  23Kiwizzi-Mugerwa, 2000). The government did however maintain control of the state copper mines 
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workers  Pa tal Priv Other All 
Across  sectors        
8 (7 6 (5) 6 (14) 7 5)  8
0 (0) ( (7) 0 (0)  3
3 (1) (18) (3)  7
(1 1 (2) 6 (14) (7)  7
  62 7) 7 (6) (7)  2
s  24 3) ( (39) 12 4)  9
)
(0) 4 (3) 3  (2)  100 (100)
            
     Agriculture 
     Mining 
0  7
(0) 
)  (0) 18 7  (4 4 (55)
0  19 47) 1   (3)
     Manufacturing  3  (3)  15 (9) 17 3
4 
  (5)
     Trade services  9  4
(0) 
)  (3) 9 (11)
     Public services 1  (7 (4) 6 2  1 (10)
     Other sector 4  (3)  (1 44 33) 46   (3 1 (11)
     All sectors  100  (100)  100 (100) 100 (100) 100 (100) 100  (100)  100 (100
Within  sectors                   
    Agriculture  87  (93)  2 (1) 2  
     Mining  4  (4)  4 (2) 84 (64) 6 (28) 0  (0)  100 (100)
     Manufacturing  28  (44)  8 (3) 34 (7) 27 (43) 0  (1)  100 (100)
     Trade services  68  (78)  2 (2) 13 (1) 13 (15) 1  (1)  100 (100)
     Public services  4  (3)  78 (84) 10 (1) 6 (8) 0  (1)  100 (100)
     Other sectors  13  (21)  20 (13) 37 (12) 27 (43) 1  (7)  100 (100)
     All sectors  53  (67)  16 (11) 16 (4) 11 (13) 2  (2)  100 (100)
Source: Own calculations using Living Conditions Monitoring Survey (1998). 
Note: Other sectors include energy, construction, transport, communication, hotels and tourism, and private services.  
 
Coupled with falling trade barriers, many of the newly privatized industries were unable to 
ompete in unprotected markets. Furthermore, the unstable macroeconomic climate and the 
lled labor-intensive. Furthermore, in response to 
lling formal employment, Table 3.3 suggests that while many of those manufacturing workers 
who were previously employed in state enterprises moved into the private sector, an equally large 
number of workers became self-employed in the informal sector. 
 
c
uncertainty surrounding the government’s commitment to reforms made the newly liberalized 
markets unattractive for private sector investment (Rakner et al., 1999). Many industries either 
collapsed or shed labor in an effort to reduce excess capacity and reestablish efficiency (Mulikita, 
2002). The previous section showed how the incidence and severity of poverty rose rapidly during 
1991-1996 across urban households and continued to rise within the less-remote and more 
urbanized provinces. A substantial part of this increase in poverty was due to rising 
unemployment. Formal manufacturing employment declined at an average annual rate of 5.9 
percent during 1991-1998. The largest decline was experienced in the food and textiles sectors, 
which have traditionally been more lower-ski
fa
  24Although most low-skilled labor moved back into agriculture, there is some evidence that higher-
skilled workers moved into rural and urban trade (hence the rising skill-intensity of the trade 
sector). Table 3.4 shows how the skill composition of industrial employment changed dramatically 
during 1991-1998. Manufacturing in particular saw a decline in its lower-skill labor-intensity, 
suggesting that is was mainly lower-skilled workers that were retrenched during the structural 
adjustment period. Agriculture provided an alternative source of employment for urban workers 
who lacked primary education. Alternatively, employment in the trade sector absorbed primary 
educated labor, although rising unemployment rates indicates that the informal sector is 
approaching saturation (CSO, 2002). Rising unemployment within urban areas was concentrated 
amongst those lower-skilled workers who did not migrate back to rural areas. However, while 
primary educated labor largely avoided migration, the lower returns in the informal trade sector 
contributed to their rising poverty. High-cost urban households by contrast benefited during the 
adjustment period. Although their incidence of poverty rose slightly between 1991 and 1996, it 
fell between 1996 and 1998. This is partly explained by the rising demand for higher skilled 
orkers across almost all sectors of the economy and the protection of the civil service.  w
 
Table 3.4. Employment Shares by Sector and Education Level (1991 and 1998) 
Sector  Share of total employment by education attainment for 1991 (1998)  
 None  Primary  Secondary  Tertiary  All 
Across sectors         
     Agriculture  71  (82)  47 (56)  11 (17)  10  (8)  48 (55) 
     Mining  1  (0)  5 (3)  4 (7)  0  (5)  3 (3) 
     Manufacturing  5  (2)  8 (6)  9 (10)  8  (6)  7 (5) 
   Trade services  5  (6)  8 (14)  8 (16)  9  (8)  7 (11) 
     Public services  4  (1)  10 (5)  32 (26)  48  (54)  12 (10) 
     Other sectors  12  (5)  20 (12)  33 (21)  22  (16)  19 (12) 
     All sectors  100  (100)  100 (100)  100 (100)  100  (100)  100 (100) 
Within sectors               
     Agriculture  48  (45)  47 (49)  3 (4)  0  (1)  100 (100) 
     Mining  13  (4)  67 (52)  18 (29)  0  (12)  100 (100) 
     Manufacturing  23  (14)  53 (53)  18 (23)  4  (8)  100 (100) 
     Trade services  22  (16)  56 (60)  16 (18)  4  (5)  100 (100) 
     Public services  10  (4)  38 (26)  36 (31)  14  (37)  100 (100) 
     Other sectors  20  (14)  50 (51)  24 (23)  4  (10)  100 (100) 
     All sectors  32  (30)  48 (49)  14 (13)  3  (7)  100 (100) 
  
Source: Own calculations from Priority Survey (1991) and Living Conditions Monitoring Surveys (1996 and 1998). 
Notes: None includes no education and grades 1 through 6; Primary includes grades 7 through 11; Secondary includes 
grade 12; and Tertiary includes all college and university levels. 
 
Changes in poverty were decomposed for different households groups into within- and between-
group effects. The results suggest that changes in different household populations have dominated 
poverty-changes within each group.
26 This is particularly true for the extremely poor, where 
migration into low-cost urban and rural non-farm groups outweighed the declines in poverty 
experienced within agricultural households. Poverty changes were also decomposed across 
provinces. The negative contribution of inter-provincial migration suggests that intra-provincial 
                                                 
26 See Table A3.2 in Appendix A. 
  25adjustment was the driving force behind overall poverty cha ese results, the 
recent pop ggests that the ds are  lect the rising 
poverty d substantial mi ion out of urban areas .  
 
Migration ove aps the greates  Zambia. The 
population census finds that for the first time in three decades the share of the urban population 
has declined, from (CSO, 2003). Table 3.5 considers 
migration between 1991 and 1998 in more detail. The h that migration 
has been n  e of the population fell f
38 perce etw n urban ral areas, there were also substantial 
shifts across household groups within these as. The been the rapid 
decline of the m  15  to five percen l small-
scale fa en
 
The changing population distributions at the provinci evel cline in urban 
me m ainly within the Lusaka and Copperbelt provinces. The 
population census, which offers a de e f suggests that urban migrants 
have more often moved into rural areas tha  in c    urban centers 
(C  200 ev opul n shares have changed 
pro c s ed  sid ly.   is confirmed by the household surveys. 
Table 3.5 suggests that most of the mediu ost u n households in the Copperbelt province 
 b m cale ers s. By contrast, 
m-co o   a av nded re ithin u ut moved into 
cost areas. This supports the earlier assertion that lower-skilled, possibly mining-related 
rs, moved into agriculture, while higher-ski or eas but shifted 
er-p he te lines in 
a -farm household populatio d rges es in rural sm ale farm 
o  possibly reflecting the return  si ce agriculture (McCulloch et a 0).  
le 3.6  s how households’ source c  have changed during 1991-1998. Focusing 
urban areas, there has been a decline   i r f agriculture. Although it cannot be 
fied n  se engaged 
o f agricultural production th r to ru  a rise in 
im ce of paid employment as a    come for urban households, suggesting that 
e ho al as had some form of wage in
eve with the exception of agricu in es, t cture of 
seholds incomes over the decade.  
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28 T ory movements of pe le betw cts within provinces. 
  26Table 3.5. Population 
Region  p
Distribution by Province and Stratum (1991 and 1998) 
Households’ share of total po ulation (%) 
  l     Rura     Urban 
 Sm s   all-scale  Medium- cale  Non-farm    Low-cost  Medium-cost  High-cost    All
  1991 1 8   1998  1991  998  1991  1998  1991 199  1991 1998 1991  1998 91/98 
Central    53. .1
Copperbelt  4. .8
Eastern  77. .0
Luapula  63. .5
Lusaka  5. .6
Northern  70. .5
North-Western 63. .3
Southern  64. .3
Western  72. .1
Zambia  47. .4
5  52.7 4.2 
4  16.9 0.3 
7  85.5 2.9 
8  81.1 0.6 
9  11.9 1.6 
1  78.3 3.6 
7  81.3 1.0 
6  65.3 7.4 
9  84.6 1.9 
5  54.9 2.6 
6.6 3.2 6.5    21.0  24
0.5 0.6 5.1    54.2  55
3.0 1.2 2.2   8.2  6
0.5 7.5 4.5    15.7  10
0.7 5.7 4.2    46.3  64
1.5 4.3 4.5    11.3  13
1.3 6.7 4.0   8.5  11
6.2 2.4 9.5    13.5  8
1.5 4.1 3.4   8.4  7
2.4 3.6 5.0    24.5  27
  10.5  2.9  7.2  6.8   100.0 
  28.9  11.7  11.6  9.9   100.0 
  3.0  2.6  7.0  0.5   100.0 
  7.2  3.2  5.2  0.1   100.0 
  33.1  7.9  7.3 10.6   100.0 
  7.3  1.4  3.4  0.7   100.0 
  10.1  1.8  9.9  0.3   100.0 
  8.1  5.8  2.5  4.6   100.0 
  10.4  2.5  2.3  1.0   100.0 
  15.1  5.3  6.4  4.9   100.0 
Source: Own calculations  onit
Note: Shares might not su e excl se
 
Table 3.6. Household  Inco
Income sources  a
using Living Conditions M
m to 100 percent due to th
Income by Source of 
oring Survey (1998). 
usion of large-scale households, who repre
me (1991 and 1998) 
Share of households’ tot
nt a very low share of total population. 
l income (%) 
 Rural    Urban 
  ediu Small-scale  M m-scale  Non-farm  Low-cost  Medium-cost  High-cost 
  991 1   1991 1998 1  1998 1991 1998  991 1998 1991 1998 1991 1998
Food  crops  75.2  
Non-food  crops  4.3  
Livestock  8.7  
Non-farm  business  1.2  
Paid  wages  9.6  
Other  sources  1.0  








 18.7 17.9  5.5   
  60.2 0.3 0.3   
 4.0 0.4 2.7   
 11.1  2.1 49.0   
  3.1 76.4 30.2   
  2.9  2.9 12.3   
 100.0 100.0 100.0   
7.9  2.8 19.1  2.8  9.9  1.2
0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
0.1 0.8 0.1 1.1 0.2 0.6
46.6 41.4 17.9 23.5 40.1 29.1
31.5 40.9 53.9 58.7 39.5 55.2
13.8 14.0  9.0 13.8 10.3 13.9
00.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Own calculations  onit
Note: Food income include uced a
 
 
using Living Conditions M
s the value of home prod
oring Survey (1998). 
nd consumed crops. 
  27Structural reforms clearly led to unemployment and migration, and changed the required skill-
intensity of many sectors. However, some authors have argued that it was the failure of the Public 
Sector Reform Program (PSRP) that posed the greatest obstacle to growth (see Rakner et al., 
1999). Launched in 1993, the PSRP attempted to reduce the inefficiency and financial burden of 
the excessive civil service. Table 3.2 shows how employment in the public services sector 
accounted for around one-third of total formal employment. Furthermore, with the exception of 
e largely state-controlled energy and transport sectors, the growth in civil service employment 
economy. Under the PSRP, the government was 
pposed to reduce employment by 25 percent by 1996, while improving capacity by raising real 
nce of poverty. Although necessary for achieving long-run growth, the short-run 
pact of structural reforms was severely negative for most urban households. Lower-skilled 
o not necessarily 
present a long-run development strategy on behalf of the government (Rakner et al., 1999). The 
th
rose rapidly relative to other sectors of the 
su
wages to attract better public employees (Rakner et al., 1999). Although over 15,000 employees 
were initially retrenched, these workers did not have contracts and as such were not entitled to 
severance packages. The high cost of retrenching civil servants partly explains why few further 
retrenchments have taken place over the 1990s.
29 Table 3.2. indicates that the size of the civil 
service has in fact risen over the 1990s, and Table 3.4 shows that skill-intensity of the public 
sector has risen considerably.
30 The inability or unwillingness of the government to reduce the size 
of the civil service has been compounded by rising public sector wages (Dinh et al., 2002). The 
failure of the public sector to implement institutional reforms has constrained its ability to switch 
expenditures from government consumption towards social spending and investment.  
 
In summary, the growing burden and inefficiency of the public sector forced the government to 
implement a series of reforms that had considerable implications for the structure of the economy 
and the incide
im
households were more severely disrupted by the rise in unemployment and changing pattern of 
employment. Urban households in high-cost areas appear to have coped better during the recession 
due to their higher educational endowments and the relative protection of higher-skilled public 
sector employment. These households are likely to have benefited later from the more skill-
intensive formal sector growth that emerged after the worst of the structural adjustment had 
passed.
31 Households with lower levels of education were forced to adjust to the new economic 
environment, either by shifting into lower paid informal sectors or by moving into rural areas. In 
rural areas these migrant households have added to the population of non-farm households, with 
poverty in this group rising accordingly.  
 
The macro and structural policies of the 1990s cannot easily be classified as being either pro-poor 
or pro-growth. These reforms were immediate responses to pending crisis, and d
re
recent resurgence of sustained investment (Table 2.1) and private sector participation does suggest 
that such reforms were a prerequisite for economic growth. Given the falling per capita incomes of 
the last two decades, it is likely that such reforms were also a prerequisite for poverty-reduction. 
However, the changing technologies and factor demands of the restructured urban industrial 
                                                 
29 Under the prevailing system civil servants are entitled to ten years severance pay. The budget constraint faced by 
the government supports the assertion that high costs might have hindered public sector reform. This retrenchment 
policy created an incentive to retrench lower-paid workers since the ten-year severance pay is lower. Furthermore, it 
was lower-skilled workers that had more casual contracts and so were not entitled to severance pay. 
30 The rising skill-intensity of the public sector is likely to be more a result of the retrenching of lower-skilled workers 
than the hiring of higher skilled-workers. See Footnote 11 for the bias caused by severance policies. 
31 Since the bulk of manufacturing growth occurred towards the end of the last decade it does not appear in the 
available survey data (see Table 2.1).  
  28economy suggests that poorer urban households, with their low educational assets, are unlikely to 
participate immediately in newly emerging and more capital-intensive urban growth. However, 
espite low-skilled labor being the primary casualty of structural adjustment, it does not 
e into employment 
mproved livelihoods. The prevailing lack of employmen r poor urban 
ouseholds is most apparent in the migration of many  to ru
nd Rural Deve
-standing urban-bias, embodied in past policies, sh esources away fr riculture 
ltural policies limited 
 determined and uniformly applied 
cross the country. Farmers were further encouraged to grow maize through marketing support 
ote and less-remote 
 the copper mines of 
the Copperbelt and the industries of Lusaka, the main investment in transport infrastructure was 
concentrated along the narrow road and rail corridors between these two areas and Zambia’s 
borders with its neighboring countries.
32 Although there was some initial investment in rural 
infrastructure during the early post-independence years, the reallocation of funds towards urban 
areas led to the deterioration of existing roads in more remote rural areas (World Bank, 2004). 
Most households in these isolated areas are subsistence farmers and are more prone to poverty.
33 
Table 3.7 shows how poverty is greater amongst households further removed from the main 
transport routes and urban centers. However, as a result of the previous government’s maize-
biased policies, and in spite of their isolation, more remote households still produced and sold 
maize, albeit to a lesser extent than less-remote households (Zulu et al., 2000).   
 
Section II identified a slight increase in rural farm poverty during 1991-1996 followed by a 
decline until 1998. Throughout this period there was a significant drop in the depth and severity of 
poverty, although this might be a result of problems with the survey (see Appendix B). This trend 
t not for non-farm rural households. Amongst 
e latter households there was a greater increase in poverty during 1991-1996 and then a smaller 
subsequent decrease. Furthermore, the depth of poverty rose for non-farm households, with the 
bulk of the increase occurring earlier in the decade. Since these two household groups had 
different experiences during the 1990s, this section first identifies those factors that are likely to 
                                                
d
necessarily follow that future investment in education will necessarily translat
and i t opportunities fo
h households back in ral economy.  
 
Agricultural Reforms a lopment 
 
The long ifted r om ag
and into mining, manufacturing and the public sector. Furthermore, agricu
diversification within agriculture. In order to ensure low food prices for urban areas, and under the 
premise of maintaining food security, the past government heavily subsidized maize production 
and research. Producer and consumer prices were centrally
a
and the public provision of fertilizer and other inputs. Despite the potential diversity afforded to 
Zambia by its agro-ecological climate, the effect of policy-induced distortions shifted production 
away from areas of comparative advantage. Accordingly agriculture’s export potential was 
undermined, and farmers grew maize in areas that were not always best-suited to this drought-
susceptible crop. By 1991 many farmers had become near mono-culturists (Saasa, 2003), while 
the cost of the subsidies amounted to 13.7 percent of the government budget in 1990 (McCulloch 
et al., 2000).  
 
One of the most important distinctions within rural areas is between rem
households (Kahkonen and Leathers, 1999). Since the economy focused on
held for small and medium-scale farm households bu
th
 
32 See Figure A3.1 in Appendix A. 
33 See Figures A3.2 and A3.3 in Appendix A.  
  29have influenced poverty amongst small and medium-scale farm households, before discussing 
non-farm households. 
able 3.7. Poverty Headcounts Across Remote and Less-Remote Areas (1998) 
 
T
Area Population  Poverty  headcount 
    Lower poverty line  Upper poverty line 
Main urban centers  3,716,626  36.8  57.9 
Less-remote rural areas  710,674  68.9  84.2 
Remote rural areas  5,677,235  73.3  85.5 
Zambia 10,104,535  59.6  75.2 
Source: Own calculations using Living Conditions Monitoring Survey (1998). 
Note: Main urban centers include the major cities of Lusaka, Ndola, and Kitwe, and areas within provincial and 
istrict capitals; Less-remote rural areas include areas within 50 kilometers of the major cities, and along the southern 
 
Agriculture has been one of the faster growing sectors of the economy and its overall contribution 
to GDP has risen accordingly (Figure 3.2). This positive trend in agriculture as a whole is also 
confirmed by national crop production data, which shows a slight upward trend over the decade 
(Figure 3.3). However, there has been considerable volatility in agricultural growth driven largely 
by high variations in rainfall. Crop production was negatively affected by the severe droughts of 
1992 and 1995. This vulnerability to fluctuations in rainfall has made rural farm households prone 
to periods of famine and severe poverty. The two droughts of the early half of the decade explain 
much of the increase in poverty that occurred between 1991 and 1996. 
 
Figure 3.2. Agriculture Value Added and Contribution to GDP (1990-2001) 
d























































Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2003a). 
 




























































Source: Zulu et al. (2000). 
 
Apart from changes in the level of crop production over the last decade, there has also been 
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Source: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAOSTAT, 2004). 
 
As suggested earlier, the government’s pan-territorial support of maize was unsustainable. Maize 
is a more drought-susceptible crop than other staple crops such as millet and cassava (World Bank, 
                                                 
34 Table A3.4 in Appendix A shows that, with the exception of cassava, much the growth in non-maize crops has been 
from initially low levels of production. 
  312004). This can be seen in Figure 3.4 in which maize is seen to be the worst affected crop during 
the 1992 and 1995 droughts. As such, those households more reliant on maize were affected more 
severely than other households. These maize-growing households were concentrated closer to the 
urban areas and lines of rail, where access to government provided inputs and marketing support 
were higher (McCulloch et al., 2000). This partly explains why the less-remote provinces 
xperienced sharper increases in poverty during the first half of the 1990s. Other more remote 
include the more cassava-dependent 
Northern and Luapula provinces (Zulu et al., 2000). These areas responded to agricultural 
aize towards areas of greater comparative 
ithin rural areas is 
lso due to a lack of available credit, a problem that exists throughout much of Zambia. This in 
e
provinces, which faired better during the drought periods, 
liberalization by shifting production away from m
advantage, with crop prices responding according (Haggblade and Zulu, 2003).
35
 
Although less remote households initially suffered more than others following the droughts and 
the removal of maize subsidies, these households have maintained their production of maize to a 
greater extent than in other areas. Zulu et al. (2000) show that farm households in the Copperbelt 
and Lusaka provinces have experienced growth in maize production during the latter half of the 
decade, with only slight declines in maize prices.
36 This continuation with maize production, 
despite the loss of the state subsidies, indicates the importance of being within close proximity to 
large maize-demanding urban markets. In fact market proximity generally plays an important role 
in shaping how households interact within the formal rural economy, and as such, whether 
individual households have participated in the recent agricultural growth (Kahkonen and Leathers, 
1999). Table 3.8 shows how households that are further removed from food markets tend to be 
more reliant on subsistence production and are more prone to poverty. Market access is also likely 
to influence production choices through the availability of inputs such as fertilizer and high-yield 
seeds (Deininger and Olinto, 2000). However, the lack of improved inputs w
a
turn is a result of the failure of reforms to generate incentives for the private sector to replace the 
state in newly liberalized markets, especially within more remote areas (Saasa, 2003). 
 
Table 3.8. Average Household Distance to Markets by Province (1998) 














Central  17.6 31.6 10.0 8.1 63.2 19.7
Copperbelt 3.9  8.5  1.8 6.8 48.8  10.1
Eastern  20.0 42.1 17.5 10.4 66.1 18.6
Luapula  18.6 31.6  1.9 18.4 66.1 18.6
Lusaka  4.2 4.9 1.5 5.5 35.2 6.6
Northern  25.0 45.0  4.1 24.3 72.1 20.1
orth-western  19.7 44.6  9.7 25.3 62.3 14.9 N
Southern  16.4 37.1 12.9 3.7 65.2 19.6
Western  23.0 39.0 18.2 15.9 79.2 25.8
National  14.8 24.9  6.9 10.0 75.4 25.6
Source: Own calculations from 1998 LCMS (CSO, 1999a). 
1. Average distance from household to food and input markets. 
 
                                                 
35 See Figures A3.4 in Appendix A. 
36 See Figures A3.5 in Appendix A. 
  32Market access and geographic location has also determined whether rural households have been 
able to participate in the recent rise in cash crop production (Kahkonen and Leathers, 1999). 
Figure 3.5 shows three of Zambia’s best performing cash crops over the last decade. Although not 
shown, horticulture and floriculture has also grown rapidly (World Bank,. 2004). These cash crops 
have been stimulated through foreign demand, and have responded positively to the removal of the 
bias against agriculture (World Bank, 2004). The partial correction of the overvalued exchange 
rate and the involvement of the private sector in these crops, often through foreign investment, 
rovided new areas of diversification and improved livelihoods for cash-crop-growing households.  p
However, market access considerations have limited these opportunities to specific areas within 
the country. For example, while smallholders are the largest producers of raw cotton, most of these 
farmers are concentrated within the Chipata district within the Eastern province. Furthermore, over 
and above the limitations imposed by its high capital demands, the production of horticulture has 
only benefited those rural households close to Lusaka airport (World Bank, 2004). Finally, sugar 
production is concentrated within the Mazabuka district in the Southern province. Each of these 
cash crop areas have better access to input and output markets, primarily through closer proximity 
to the main transport routes.
37 Furthermore, these areas along the main transport corridors already 
appear to have experienced greater declines in poverty even prior to 1998.
38
 

























































































Source: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAOSTAT, 2004). 
Note: Figure does not show floricultural production which has been one of the fastest growing cash crops in recent 
years (World Bank, 2004). 
  
Participation in cash crop production is limited more by market access considerations than are 
staples crops. Access to domestic input and foreign output markets for cash crops requires 
logistical and extension support. In the case of cotton, this support is already being provided by 
e private sector through well functioning out-grower schemes for raw materials (Saasa, 2003). 
The large cotton company in the Eastern province provides the necessary inputs at the beginning 
of the planting season, with the commitment from farmers that the cotton will be sold to the 
company at harvest. This system bypasses the shortage of credit that constrains farm households 
                                                
th
 
37 See Figure A3.1 in Appendix A. 
38 See Figures A3.2 and A3.3 in Appendix A. 
  33elsewhere in the country. These new opportunities to engage in cash crop production have 
improved livelihoods and reduced poverty within less remote areas of the country. This is seen in 
the rural cotton-producing Chipata district, where the poverty headcount is lower than the rural 
average. However, the largest gains from cash crop expansion began during the second half of the 
1990s and as such have not been adequately captured in the available surveys.  
 
The changing pattern of agricultural production has affected the income sources that rural 
households depend on. Table 3.6 shows how food production, which was previously supported by 
maize subsidies, declined in importance between 1991 and 1998. This falling income share is the 
result of crop diversification and the lower monetary value of these alternative crops. By contrast, 
all other sources of income have either maintained their share or grown in importance. This 
growth is especially true for income from non-farm businesses. By contrast, medium-scale farm 
households have become substantially more reliant on non-food crop income. This supports the 
assertion that it is mainly these households that have participated in the growth of cash crops 
during the 1990s.
39 Non-farm households by contrast have experienced a declining share of 
agricultural income, and have experienced declines in incomes from paid employment. Rather 
these households have become more reliant on non-farm businesses. This shift into self-
mployment coincides with an influx of urban migrants, which together might explain the rising 
. 
et access as many rural households are unable to produce 
 marketable surplus. 
ral observation that land is relatively abundant in 
ambia.  In spite of land abundance, land tenure policies are important for smallholders. Under 
e
poverty amongst these households
 
The performance of agriculture has been the fundamental determinant of poverty for a majority of 
the country’s households over the last decade. More than two-thirds of the population lives in rural 
areas, with most of these households engaged in some form of crop production. Although reforms 
have led to promising signs of agricultural growth in recent years, the persistence of poverty 
suggests that there remain significant constraints to poor households’ participation in this growth 
process. As identified above, one of the key constraints is market access created by poor rural 
infrastructure such that around 40 percent of agricultural households are still engaged solely in 
subsistence agriculture. However, apart from inadequate market access, low productivity is the 
second major constraint to agriculture-led growth and poverty-reduction. Low productivity in 
Zambia more often supercedes poor mark
a
 
There are two main arguments explaining low productivity amongst Zambian agricultural 
households. The first suggests that farm households face a land constraint. Zulu et al. (2000) find 
that crop incomes are highly correlated with land size, and that this correlation is present in all 
districts. From this they conclude that farm size rather than district-specific infrastructure and 
market access is important in determining poverty, and as such, that land shortages are the most 
important constraint to expanding agricultural output and incomes. However, despite the observed 
correlation between farm size and crop value, it does not necessarily follow that land availability 
acts as the key constraint to agricultural growth. Despite a gradual rise over the last three decades, 
land densities remain low, justifying the gene
40 Z
the previous government land allocation was centrally controlled and tenure was restricted to a 
                                                 
39 Although a general finding, the particularly high share of non-food crops is driven by changes taking place within 
the Eastern province. 
40 The abundance of land does not necessarily imply the availability of land suitable for agriculture. Land degradation 
and poor soil quality is a serious concern in many areas of Zambia (Saasa, 2003). 
  34few large-scale and commercial farmers (Saasa, 2003). More recently there have been attempts to 
decentralize the land tenure system, with control moving to local governments and customary 
leaders. While this process should in principal give smallholder farmers better access to land, the 
implementation of the new system has not been completed. Most land allocation decisions are still 
made by central government and many smallholders do not own the land on which they work. As 
a result smallholders lack the key asset needed for acquiring private credit, a situation made worse 
by the removal of state input support schemes. 
 
Other studies have identified labor shortages during the planting season as the main constraint to 
agricultural growth, a situation made worse by the limited availability of productive farm capital, 
and the lack of credit, inputs and extension support (Deininger and Olinto, 2002; Haggblade and 
Tembo, 2003).
41 Poor labor supply can been attributed to migration out of rural areas and the 
worsening HIV/AIDS pandemic (Garbus, 2003). The importance of relieving the labor constraint 
can be seen in the successes of new conservation farming techniques (Haggblade and Tembo, 
2003) and by productivity-enhancing input support schemes (World Bank, 2004). Many 
households have responded to labor shortages by hiring labor during the planting season (Saasa, 
2003). Although selling labor provides an alternative source of income, it has also created rural 
overty traps. Crop failure has forced households to sell labor, thereby worsening their own labor 
rket access has limited the 
bility of smallholders to produce cash crops, leading to a concentration of cash crop production 
dium-scale farmers.   
p
constraint, reducing crop incomes, and further necessitating off-farm employment. By typically 
supporting output rather than input markets, the new government has focused on households 
already producing for markets, rather than stimulating productivity and enabling poorer 
subsistence-focused households to participate in agricultural markets.  
 
In summary, agriculture has been the main factor driving poverty-changes in Zambia over the 
1990s. Structural reforms incurred adjustment costs as rural farm households lost access to inputs 
and output support and shifted production away from maize . However, unlike the urban-based 
industrial sectors, agriculture has continued growing during the reform period. Furthermore, the 
removal of the anti-agricultural-export bias and the improved investment environment have 
stimulated cash crop exports and production. However, two constraints have limited poor 
households’ participation in this new agricultural growth. First, poor ma
a
within specific areas of the country. Inaccessible remote rural markets have also limited marketed 
non-cash-crop production. Secondly, low productivity limits the ability of farmers to respond to 
the new opportunities arising from structural reforms (UNDP, 2003). This is a result of a labor 
constraint that is worsened by poor farm capital and low-value inputs, and entrenched by 
inadequate access to credit. The latter is an economy-wide constraint resulting from the private 
sectors’ inability or unwillingness to replace previous state involvement (Kahkonen and Leathers, 
1999).
42 Agricultural reforms during the 1990s have generally been pro-growth in as far as they 
have helped stimulate diversification away from maize production, and pro-poor in that they have 
created new opportunities for small and me
                                                 
41 In the case of appropriate extension services there is the example of successful conservation farming in Zambia. 
This technology spreads the labor demands of land preparation and crop tending across the year, thereby lessening 
peak-season bottlenecks and improving natural resource management (Haggblade and Tembo, 2003). 
42 Kahkonen and Leathers (1999) provide an assessment of the institutional and supply-chain barriers preventing the 
private sector from replacing the public sector following liberalization of the agricultural marketing system. 
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Pro-Poor Government Spending  
 
Social indicators have been falling in Zambia over the last decades. While part of the failure of 
cial outcomes is driven by falling GDP per capita and rising poverty, the changing level and  so
allocation of government spending has contributed to these developments. Pro-poor spending in 
this section covers government spending on (i) rural infrastructure, (ii) health, and (iii) education. 
As discussed above, government expenditure was originally allocated towards improving social 
outcomes. However, fiscal constraints during the 1980s reduced public spending. The 
improvements in social indicators achieved during the early post-independence years were 
reversed, with mortality and other health-related indicators worsening dramatically. During the 
reforms of the early 1990s the government failed to implement policies designed to raise the level 
and effectiveness of pro-poor spending.  
 
Rural infrastructure in particular has suffered from macro-stabilization policies. During structural 
adjustment the government adopted a “cash budget” system, under which expenditures were 
limited to available revenues (Dinh et al., 2002). Although this system lowered and stabilized 
inflation, it hampered the allocation of public expenditure. Under the cash-budget system, the 
government invariably announced budget allocations just prior to disbursement, creating an 
centive to cover those expenditures requiring short planning periods (Dinh et al., 2002; World 
ucation and 
ealth facilities. Therefore missing and deteriorating infrastructure, especially in remoter rural 
reas. 
he long-standing bias towards urban areas and the paved roads that connect them created an 
in
Bank, 2003b). Furthermore funds were directed towards general public services with higher public 
sector employment, and away from economic services such as infrastructure. Short-term funding 
pressures therefore replaced longer-term development expenditure, with rural infrastructure and 
other social expenditures suffering as a result. 
 
The importance of rural infrastructure in determining the participation of poor households in 
agricultural growth has already been identified. In 1998, only 18 percent of rural households were 
within five kilometers of input markets, and few remote households had access to ed
h
areas remains a major constraint to achieving pro-poor growth (Republic of Zambia, 2002). In 
addressing this problem the government has faced two competing needs (World Bank, 2004). 
First, long-term neglect of road maintenance has created a pressing need for repairs to both less-
remote paved and more remote feeder roads. Despite new policies, at the end of the 1990s around 
30 percent of the paved road network was still in need of repairs and maintenance. Such poor 
conditions have undermined less-remote rural households’ access to markets, especially for cash 
crop producing households for whom access to formal urban and foreign markets is most 
important (Lofgren et al., 2004). Second, beyond the deterioration of the existing road network, 
the government has acknowledged the need to extend the network into more remote rural a
T
inadequate road system in remoter areas, which has undoubtedly contributed to the relative 
isolation of many rural households and their dependence on subsistence agriculture. Although 
government policies have proposed building new feeder roads, to date there has been little success 
in implementing such policies (World Bank, 2004). The country’s poorest households continue to 
be neglected and their opportunities for engaging in marketed agriculture remain limited 
(Kahkonen and Leathers, 1999).  
 
Health concerns in Zambia include tuberculosis, malaria, and diarrhea. However, these illnesses 
are dominated by the onslaught of HIV/AIDS. The most recent health survey estimates adult 
  36prevalence at 15.6 percent (CSO, 2002), while other sources suggest rates as high as 21.5 percent 
lthough high urban prevalence has contributed to the rise in poverty, the poverty and inequality 
trends identified in Section II are unlikely to have captured the entire impact of AIDS since the 
main escalation of the pandemic took place during the second half of the 1990s. Despite the 
suggestion by UNAIDS (2003) that the infection rates have leveled off in recent years, the 
magnitude of the pandemic remains a major concern for human capital accumulation and labor 
productivity in Zambia. While it is difficult to empirically determine the direct and indirect 
impacts of AIDS on poverty and inequality, the individual and economy-wide burden associated 
with losses in worker productivity, falling labor force participation, and rising health expenditures 
are widely acknowledged (UNDP, 2003).  
 
In urban areas, the rising health costs and falling labor productivity increases the tendency of 
industries to adopt more capital-intensive technologies. In rural areas, AIDS worsens the labor 
shortage  (Nweke et al., 2004) and diverts family members away from schooling and employment 
towards care-giving (World Bank, 2004). Longer-term livelihoods are negatively affected as 
households sell assets to cover rising health and burial costs. The provision of both education and 
health services have also been undermined due to high prevalence amongst teachers and health 
providers. School enrolment rates have fallen as children are withdrawn from schooling to aid 
with farming and care-giving (UCSF, 2003). As such, the impact of AIDS is likely to severely 
undermine growth and poverty-reduction. 
 
Haacker (2002a; 2002b) discusses various approaches used to assess the impact of AIDS on 
economic growth for a number of Southern African countries. Within an open-economy model 
and in the case of Zambia, Haacker (2002b) finds a medium-term decline in output per capita of 
5.8 percent and a long-term decline in GDP per capita of 1.8 percent. Increasing mortality and 
changes in total factor productivity are identified as the most significant driving factors. Lofgren et 
al. (2004) employ a dynamic economy-wide model to determine the effect of AIDS on Zambia’s 
growth path to 2015. Building on a more detailed background study of AIDS in Zambia (World 
Bank, 2004), the authors’ find that the pandemic reduces annual GDP growth by one percentage 
point, with higher population growth diluting aggregate poverty effects. However, the ultimate 
economic impact of AIDS will depend on the government’s political will (Scott, 2000). Lofgren et 
al. (2004) find that, despite gains from higher growth, the financing of treatment places a burden 
on the budget that may prove unbearable without external support. In this regard the government 
faces a trade-off between addressing the immediate need for AIDS treatment, and finding an 
adequate link between the political processes under the PRSP and HIPC agendas. 
 
                                                
(CIA, 2004).
43 Existing evidence finds that prevalence is substantially higher in urban areas, and 
that young women are the most affected by the pandemic (CSO, 2002). Furthermore, the number 
of AIDS orphans has risen substantially over the 1990s. These children have either been cared for 
by extended families, or have joined the growing number of street-children in Zambia’s main 
urban centers, with poverty rising in both cases (World Bank, 2001). The government’s response 
to the pandemic has been limited. Donor-funded non-government organizations have implemented 
most treatment and prevention programs (UCSF, 2003). Furthermore, while government health 
expenditure as a share of total expenditure has risen in line with donor demands, it has fallen in 




43 See Table A3.5 in Appendix A. 
  37Education spending has also deteriorated in real terms over the last decade, such that even urban 
hools lack basic resources (Rakner et al., 1999). As a result, primary school enrolment rates fell 
ities, 
ducation was most important in protecting workers from formal sector job-losses resulting from 
lity and 
npredictability of the system have prevented effective government planning. In addition there is a 
ruption and poor 
olicy effectiveness in Zambia. Trends suggest that while governance improved towards the end 
                                                
sc
from 83 to 72 percent during the 1990s, and secondary school enrolment has remained stagnant. 
This decline was particularly pronounced in rural areas where enrolment rates fell by ten 
percentage points to 60 percent. Education facilities in rural areas have been undermined by the 
government’s long-standing bias towards urban areas. However, over and above inadequate public 
investment, school enrolment has also fallen due to the increased burden of education costs on 
parents, with children being withdrawn from school as a result (World Bank, 2003b).  
 
As discussed above, educational endowments were important during structural reforms, 
particularly for urban households. Rather than helping workers engage in new job opportun
e
structural reforms. In recent years there is evidence of renewed manufacturing growth, and the 
rising skill-intensity of production suggests that educated labor is more likely to benefit. However, 
the general absence of formal employment opportunities, possibly due to a lack of private sector 
investment, suggests that education is not the binding constraint to improved urban livelihoods. In 
rural areas it is likely that literacy and basic education will play an important role in determining 
the sustained adoption of extension services and new production technologies (Saasa, 2003). 
 
The World Bank (2003b) identifies the cash-budget system as being the main cause behind 
deteriorating health and education during the structural adjustment period. Beyond the shortening 
of the planning horizon, which severely undermined rural investment, the volati
u
lack of transparency and considerable wastage within the system. Benefit incidence analysis also 
suggests that expenditure during the 1990s was not necessarily the most efficient at addressing 
poverty (World Bank, 2001). While primary school expenditure has been pro-poor, secondary and 
tertiary level expenditures have not been. Furthermore, health expenditures have benefited the 
middle of the income distribution, with spending on hospitals benefiting largely the non-poor.  
 
The poor performance of public spending is a combined result of both inefficient and falling real 
expenditure, as well as poor public management and lacking financial accountability. The 
centralization of public functions also undermined public investment and services, especially in 
rural areas (Crook and Manor, 2001). Measures of governance reveal high cor
p
of the structural adjustment period, the country has performed poorly in more recent years 
(Kaufman et al., 2004). These trends apply to the effectiveness of government policy, the quality 
of regulation practices, control of corruption, and political stability.
44 The initial improvement in 
many of these dimensions of governance contributed to or reflected the improved economic and 
political environment that promoted higher investment and growth towards the end of the 1990s.  
 
 
44 See Table A3.6 in Appendix A. 
  38Gender Disparities and Pro-Poor Growth 
ender differentials have not proven central to understanding the drivers of pro-poor growth 
imilar in 
oth household groups by 1998. However this narrowing of the gap did not come about through 
 to be drawn out of 
chool. This trend is likely to have increased in recent years due to greater HIV/AIDS-related care-
 in Zambia has been 
ggravated by high workloads. Women, especially with low education, not only work more hours 
 market activities than do their male counterparts, but they also spend considerably more time on 
omestic activities (Fontana, 2002). The extra hours spent on families’ well-being compromises 
omen’s productivity in market activities and their ability to generate higher incomes. Finally, 
women are the worst affected by HIV/AIDS (UCSF, 2003), especially within the most productive 
15-24 age cohort. While a large share of women are directly affected by the disease, an even larger 
portion carry the main burden of care-giving, which further compromises their productivity in 
market activities, their ability to generate higher incomes, and their potential flexibility to react to 
economic changes. Therefore while women appeared to have suffered less from structural 
adjustment, their vulnerability and lack of human capital will make it difficult to participate in the 
growth process, particularly in the more skill-demanding urban formal sector. 
 
G
during the structural adjustment period. However, men and women have faced very different 
experiences over the last decade. As seen in Table 2.1, the poverty gap between male and female-
headed households narrowed during the 1990s, such that the incidence of poverty was s
b
reductions in poverty. Rather, poverty amongst male-headed households rose to match that of 
female-headed households. Accordingly, Zambia’s rank in the Gender-Related Development 
Index (GDI) in 2001 remained high at 133, due to poor indicators for female-to-male school 
enrolment ratios, education achievements, literacy rates, and earned incomes (UNDP, 2003).  
 
The gap in primary school enrolment rates between males and females has increased during the 
1990s from two to almost seven percent in 2002 (UNDP, 2003). Despite slightly better 
performance during the first schooling years, female drop-out rates in the final grades of primary 
school remain higher than for males, indicating that females are more likely
s
giving needs. The educational bias against females is higher at higher educational levels. The 
ratios of females to males with primary, secondary, and tertiary education severely decline from 
0.93 to 0.80 and 0.46 respectively. Consequently, the literacy rate of young females (15-24 years) 
has declined by almost 6 percentage points since 1990. This imposes a serious bias against 
women’s economic competitiveness, especially within the formal sector (UNDP, 2003).   
 
Despite an educational disadvantage the female share of the total labor force was nearly 50 percent 
in 1998. However, the share of women employed in (low-productivity) agriculture is much higher 
than for men, especially for food crop sectors (Fontana, 2002). The agricultural sector is largely 
non-monetary with low imputed wages and limited actual wage earnings. Therefore the wage-gap 
between similarly-qualified men and women makes women’s cost-of-living-adjusted earned 
income around half the earned income of men. However, the disadvantages in education and 
formal income earnings at the start of the 1990s seem to have ‘protected’ women during structural 
adjustment. Men were the worst affected by the collapse of the mining and manufacturing sectors, 
since they dominated formal non-agricultural employment during the pre-adjustment period. As a 
result male poverty rates rose faster than female poverty rates during the 1990s.  
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ummary 
nce, recently renewed 
ining export growth raises concerns about a possible trade-off between copper-led growth and 
surgence of the mining sector, 
iversification away from copper remains essential since past dependence on copper has proven 
S
 
Section II identified considerable divergence between the experiences of rural and urban 
households during the structural adjustment period. This section has linked specific structural 
adjustment policies to the poverty outcomes experienced by different population groups.  
 
Rapidly rising urban poverty was driven by escalating formal sector unemployment, which 
suffered under concurrent privatization and trade liberalization. Persistent macroeconomic 
instability and political uncertainty removed the incentive for private investment to replace the 
withdrawing public sector. Contractionary fiscal policy, under the auspices of macro-stabilization, 
protected the civil service to the detriment of real social spending. Educational achievements and 
health deteriorated, especially in the context of poor initial conditions and rising HIV/AIDS. Rural 
poverty by contrast fell during the 1990s. This was a result of the long-standing urban-bias, which, 
while having limited the ability of rural areas to benefit from past growth, effectively shielded a 
large portion of the rural population from the collapse of the urban economy.  
 
Despite relative isolation, there have been substantial changes in agricultural production and rural 
livelihoods as a result of structural adjustment. Perhaps the most important change was the 
substantial increase in the number of small-scale farmers as urban households migrated back into 
rural areas. Some migrating urban households, especially lower-educated households, undoubtedly 
carried their assets (and higher incomes) back into rural areas thereby reducing aggregate rural 
poverty. However, the growth and diversification that took place within agriculture during the 
1990s suggests that migration can only explain part of the decline in small and medium-scale 
poverty. The removal of the maize-bias caused staples production to shift towards more drought-
resilient food crops. This diversification towards areas of better comparative advantage caused 
poverty to decline, especially in the northern provinces. The greatest declines in the depth of 
poverty occurred in those areas where there has been foreign-investment in exportable cash-crops. 
However, cash-crop growth has benefited relatively few and mainly medium-scale households. 
Extending the benefits from both staples and cash-crop growth is constrained by poor market 
access and low farm productivity. Despite agriculture’s strong performa
m
pro-poor agricultural growth. However, regardless of a re
d





  40Section IV. Trade-Offs Between Growth and Pro-Poor Growth 
 
O er the last three decades th een  etwe ia’s adopted growth path and 
broad-based poverty-reduction. Copper mining dominated post-independence industrial policy, 
which, despite promoting gro  th rm d i -ru an 
unsustainable source of growth. The resulting urban-bias of public investme enefited  n 
households with relatively few spillovers into rural areas. Agricultural po s were g d 
towards food security and maintaining low food prices in urba eas. Altho  many fa rs 
s  production, there were relatively fe pportuniti  incentiv or 
t  production into s ustaining growth. Rural areas becam lated fro e 
urban-based growth process and the urban-rural poverty-gap widened. As the copper-led growth 
path faltered during the mid-1980s, the government opted to reduce pro-poor spending to ma in 
t nd state-enterprises. Unsustainable growth and falling p apita inc s, 
especially in rural areas, suggests that the adoption of a pro-growth inward-oriented copper-led 
r. Growth remained sector and region-specific, and did not 
nt and GDP growth were 
stained for the first time since the early 1980s. This section uses a computable general 
wth path on poverty reduction; 
and (ii) trade-offs between altern ro-growth and pro
 
Poverty-Reduction under the Cu row 1-2
 
Following recent growth trends, Zambia is assume grow at f ercent p r during 1-
2 ent growth path assumes that world cop prices continue falling and 
i er mining are slow but forthcoming.
47  lation gr , labor  et 
d nts, and sector productivi ncorporate the impact of HIV/AIDS (IMF, 2003), while 
ten-year trends in crop yields determ speci oductivi o ank, 200
 
                                                
v ere has b conflict b en Zamb
wth in e medium-te , prove n the long n to be 
nt b urba
licie eare
n ar ugh rme
hifted to subsidized maize w o es or es f
ransforming maize elf-s e iso m th
inta
he civil service a er c ome
strategy was not ultimately pro-poo
offer long-run opportunities for the poor to participate in the growth process. 
 
The current government recognized the need for reform. Structural adjustment during the 1990s 
removed some of the distortions caused by the long-standing urban and maize biases. The artificial 
profitability of protected state-enterprises, financed by copper exports, meant that privatization 
and trade liberalization undermined the formal non-agricultural economy and promoted reverse 
migration into rural areas. While urban poverty rose, the rural economy continued to grow despite  
adjustment costs during the initial shift away from maize production. In the short-term structural 
adjustment was neither pro-poor nor pro-growth for urban areas. However, Zambia has recently 
experienced a period of renewed growth suggesting that longer-term sustainable growth 
necessitated the structural reforms and diversification of the 1990s. As discussed in Section II, 
investment was sufficiently positive during 1999-2001 to overcome previously falling capital 
stocks and total factor productivity. More importantly, investme
su





th Path, 200 015 
d to  our p er yea  200
015.
46 The curr per 
nvestments in copp Popu owth mark
evelopme ties i
ine crop- fic pr ty growth (W rld B 4). 
 
45 atially disaggregate E model based on a highly ggregated  untin rix 
( eatures provincial production and factor marke l com ity market, a large num of 
e latter were derived from the 1998 household survey, which forms the 
evised Minimum Standards Model (RMSM). 
 World copper prices and domestic output fall at two percent and one percent per year respectively. This corresponds 
to the ‘average-case’ scenario identified in Lofgren et al. (2004). 
 This section uses a sp d CG  disa social acco g mat
SAM) that f ts, a nationa mod  and  ber 
provincially representative households. Th
basis of the ‘micro-simulation’ model. Appendix C describes the model in more detail.  
46 The detailed characteristics of the current growth path can be found in Lofgren et al. (2004) and in World Bank 
004), and is primarily based on projections from the World Bank’s R (2
47
  41Table 4.1. Growth Decomposition for Simulations 
  Contribution to average annual GDP growth rate (%) 
  1999-01 2001-15 2001-15 2001-15 2001-15 











GDP at factor cost  3.7 4.0 5.0 5.0  5.0
     Physical capital
  0.2 1.2 2.2 1.4 1.4
     Human capital  2.0 0.8 0.8 0.8  0.8
     Total factor productivity  1.5 2.0 2.0 2.8  2.8
GDP at factor cost  3.7 4.0 5.0 5.0  5.0
     Agriculture  0.5 1.2 0.7 2.3  1.0
     Mining  0.2 0.2 1.2 0.1  0.1
     Manufacturing  0.4 0.8 0.6 0.7  0.8
     Services  2.6 1.8 2.4 1.9  3.0
Source: Zambia CGE-micro model results. 
1. The growth decomposition for the renewed growth period during 1999-2001 (see Table 2.1). 
 
Decomposing growth under the current growth path indicates that higher investment accelerates 
e accumulation of capital and raises total factor productivity, whose contributions to GDP 
 By contrast, human capital’s 
contribution to growth declines as labor force growth slows in response to HIV/AIDS. The 
resurgence of the mining and services sectors experienced during the renewed growth period 
eventually levels-off, and agriculture and manufacturing accelerate slightly. There is a gradual 
shift in the sectoral composition of new investment leading to higher capital-intensification in non-
mining sectors. This is particularly true in the case of agriculture, where intensification and 
diversification arise through strong growth in exportable cash-crops brought about by a partial 
correction of the real exchange rate. The sectoral distortions from past policy-biases are gradually 
removed and the country moves along a more balanced growth path.  
 
Table 4.2. Poverty Changes for Simulations (Upper Poverty Line) 
  Final poverty rate in 2015 
th














Headcount (P0)  75.4 68.3 56.6 59.4  63.9
     Rural  85.6 78.4 74.7 68.1  76.4
          Small-scale  86.4 79.0 76.5 68.1  77.2
          Medium-scale  80.3 69.5 63.3 56.3  65.2
     Urban  58.3 51.4 26.5 45.0  42.9
Squared poverty gap (P2)  25.6 20.4 15.9 15.1  18.3
     Rural  33.3 26.5 23.0 19.2  24.
33.7 26.6 23.7 18.7  24.
27.7 21.1 18.6 15.5  19.6
     Urban  12.6 10.2 4.0 8.2  7.7
7
9           Small-scale 
          Medium-scale 
Source: Zambia CGE-micro model results. 
1. The initial poverty rates in 2001 are the same as those in 1998 (see Table 2.2) since the 2002 household survey 
containing information on poverty and distribution was not available.  
 
  42Poverty is reduced due to balanced growth and rising per capita GDP.
48 Both the incidence and 
epth of poverty fall, with the largest declines taking place within urban areas and amongst 
opperbelt, Eastern and Western provinces. Strong growth in 
ash-crops generates high pro-poor growth in the cotton-dominated rural areas of Eastern 
d
medium-scale farm households. Medium-scale households benefit from the rapid growth in 
exportable cash-crops given the importance of this income source for these households (see Table 
3.6). Urban poverty-reduction is more evenly distributed due to equally fast growth in both the 
formal manufacturing and more-informal service sectors. The latter is driven by rising demand and 
backward linkages from primary and secondary sector growth. 
 
The national GIC under the current growth path is relatively flat, although faster agricultural 
growth suggests a slight positive bias towards the lower end of the distribution. This is evident in 
the pro-poor growth rates for rural and urban areas. The national pro-poor growth rate is 1.3 
percent per year and is driven by strong growth in rural areas. Despite differences in poverty 
reduction across rural and urban areas, the variation across provinces is less pronounced (Figure 
A4.1). The only exceptions are the C
c
province.
49 By contrast, poverty in Western province, one of the poorest and most isolated 
provinces, declines by a mere three percent during 2001-2015. Pro-poor growth is lowest in the 
more-urbanized Copperbelt province due to a slowdown in the mining sector. 
 




















































Source: Zambia CGE-micro model results. 
 
 
                                                 
48 Population growth is two percent per year, implying GDP per capita growth rate of two percent during 2001-2015. 
49 Pro-poor growth amongst the other provinces growing exportable cash-crops (Southern, Central and Lusaka) is 
diluted by the slowdown in these provinces’ urban economies, which are larger than in the Eastern Province. 
  43Trade-Offs Between Alternative Growth Paths 
 
The current growth path described the likely relationship between growth and poverty reduction 
over the coming one and a half decades. However the growth path ultimately adopted will be 
determined by government policies and external factors. As already eluded to above, there is 
concern over a possible trade-off between mining and rural development. The rising share of 
agriculture in GDP that was experienced throughout the 1990s has declined in recent years in line 
with renewed mining production. The difference in distributional gains between diversification 
to agriculture and a return to copper mining is therefore of considerable importance.  in
Furthermore, in recent years there has been increased growth amongst the manufacturing and 
services sectors, and the current growth path described above suggests that this should reduce 
urban poverty. In response to these three alternative growth paths, this section compares the 
impacts of (i) copper-led growth; (ii) agriculture-led growth; and (iii) non-agriculture-led growth 
in formal sectors other than mining.  
 
(i) The copper-led growth scenario considers a more optimistic projection for the Zambian mining 
ector. World demand strengthens and copper prices rebound from their current gradual decline. 
nder copper-led 
rowth. There is considerable change in the sectoral structure of growth. Mining’s contribution to 
s
Perhaps more importantly given the recently failed privatization attempt, it is assumed that the 
investment required to recapitalize and extend current mining operations becomes available. 
According to a detailed mining sector study conducted by the World Bank (2004), both world 




The improved terms-of-trade from rising world copper prices facilitates an increase in imports, 
which is only partially offset by an appreciating real exchange rate.
51 The appreciation undermines 
the competitiveness of non-mining exports, particularly for more tradable cash-crop and 
manufactured exports. Despite displacing domestic production, cheaper imports benefit import-
intensive investment leading to a more rapid accumulation of physical capital. GDP growth 
accelerates from four percent under the current growth path to five percent u
g
GDP increases considerably, effectively crowding-out other sectors. Agriculture suffers as cash-
crop exports decline, and import competition undermines urban demand for domestic goods. 
Slower manufacturing growth reduces forward-linkages to food processing. Mining and 
agriculture’s shares of GDP ultimately return to their pre-structural adjustment levels.
52  
 
Higher economic growth raises the rate of pro-poor growth to 2.9 percent per year. However, 
distributional changes under copper-led growth are substantially different than under the current 
growth path. The incidence and depth of poverty declines dramatically in urban areas, especially 
amongst households living in high and medium-cost areas. Although rural farm households benefit 
from backward linkages arising from urban consumption growth, poverty reduction remains 
                                                 
50 Alternative mining scenarios and their impact on Zambia are described in detail in Lofgren et al. (2004). 
51 Higher copper export prices increase the value of exports. Additional foreign earnings allow Zambia to raise 
imports, which increase sufficiently to maintain the fixed current account balance. Accordingly, the real exchange rate 
appreciates to make imports relatively cheaper for importers, thereby undermining exports in sectors that didn’t 
benefit from higher world prices (in this case all non-mining export sectors). Households employed in non-mining 
sectors suffer, while households with high import-intensive consumption patterns benefit from cheaper imports.  
52 Evidence of this potential trade-off between mining and agriculture has already been seen during the recent growth 
period (1999-2001) where mining growth displaced agriculture (see Table 2.1). 
  44relatively slight indicating that rural households are less likely to participate in the growth process. 
The GIC under copper-led growth is strongly upward sloping indicating that the rate of pro-poor 
rowth under this scenario is highly sensitive to the definition of the poverty line. As was the case  g
during the decades leading up to the 1990s, the country’s poorest households are effectively 
isolated from urban-based growth due to mining’s weak backward-linkages into rural areas and 
the higher import-intensity of higher-income urban consumers. The spatial distribution of growth 
is highly unequal, with the urbanized Copperbelt and Lusaka provinces being the largest 
beneficiaries of mining sector growth (Figure A4.2).  
 
(ii) An alternative growth path is the continued diversification into agriculture that began during 
the structural adjustment period. Since Section III identified low farm productivity as a major 
constraint, the agriculture-led growth scenario considers the distributional impact of increasing 
agricultural productivity. To maintain comparability, TFP growth is increased evenly across all 
gricultural sectors to match the aggregate GDP growth rate achieve under the copper-led growth 
ubstantially more important. 
his is primarily at the expense of the more urbanized service sectors, which have lower demand 
a
scenario. This translates into an annual agricultural TFP growth rate of 4.4 percent compared to 
2.2 percent under the current growth path.
53  
 
Higher farm productivity benefits rural households through higher home-produced consumption 
and increased incomes from cash-crops and domestically traded staples. The incidence and depth 
of rural poverty declines. Urban households benefit from lower food prices leading to falling 
urban poverty, albeit not to the same extent as in rural areas. Agriculture-led growth generates the 
same growth rate and pro-poor growth rate as copper-led growth. However, the downward sloping 
growth incidence curve indicates that poverty reduction through agricultural growth is strongly 
biased in favor of the country’s poorest population, making the pro-poor growth rate less sensitive 
to the definition of the poverty line. Accelerated agricultural growth changes the structure of the 
Zambian economy. Agricultural production and exports becoming s
T
in and fewer forward linkages to the rural economy. Pro-poor growth in the Lusaka and 
Copperbelt provinces is therefore lower relative to other provinces (Figure A4.3). 
 
(iii) The rapid rise and high incidence of urban poverty during the 1990s indicates that rural 
development cannot be the government’s only priority. The long-standing political bias towards 
urban areas, as well as the need to alleviate urban poverty, suggests that a non-agriculture-led 
growth path should be considered. Similar to the agriculture-led growth scenario, TFP growth 
under this scenario is increased across non-mining secondary sectors and tourism such that 
aggregate GDP matches the five percent growth rate achieved under the copper-led growth path.
54 
This non-agricultural growth scenario does not represent a return to state-subsidized industrial 
expansion. Publicly-financed non-agricultural growth has failed in the past and is therefore not 
considered. Rather it is assumed that improved productivity comes about through other means, 
uch as increased competition from liberalization or private sector investment. Unlike in the past,  s
manufacturing cannot rely on copper-financed imported investment and intermediate goods. 
                                                 
53 According to FAOSTAT (2004), doubling Zambian agricultural TFP growth is roughly equivalent to matching the 
average agricultural TFP growth rates achieved by Kenya and Ethiopia during the 1990s.  
54 The scenarios simulates the effect of increased growth within formal non-agricultural sectors. These include 
manufacturing, energy, construction, and tourism. Financial, trade and transport services are assumed to be driven 
either by informal activity or by backward linkages from other sectors and are therefore not directly affected. 
  45Perhaps more positively, non-agricultural exports in this scenario are not hampered by a copper-
laden overvalued real exchange rate.  
 
Non-agricultural growth increases employment opportunities for urban households thereby 
reducing urban poverty. However, poverty declines more for medium-cost than low-cost 
households because the latter are better endowed with higher-skilled labor for which demand is 
highest. This conforms to the findings of Section III which identified the importance of education 
in determining urban employment opportunities during the structural adjustment period. Therefore 
the participation of the urban poor depends on the demand generated for lower-skilled labor and 
on the levels of human capital that these households command. Rural areas benefit from backward 
nkages from urban growth, although the declines in rural poverty are substantially lower than 
under the agriculture-led growth scenario. Accordingly, there is convergence in pro-poor growth 
rates across provinces (Figure A4.4). 
 
The growth incidence curve for non-agriculture-led growth is flat, but lower than the agriculture-
led growth curve across the entire population. The reason for the weaker poverty-reduction lies in 
the high skill and capital-intensity of manufacturing and formal sector services. Under the copper-
led growth path investment was encouraged through increased copper-financed imports. However, 
the poor export-orientation of the previously protected manufacturing sectors implies that foreign 
exchange for imported investment and intermediate goods is likely to be a significant constraint. 
Therefore despite improvements in macroeconomic stability and over and above labor market 
constraints, the success of a non-agriculture-led growth path will hinge on its ability to generate 
foreign earnings. Since the new government has opted for a more market-driven economy, public 
policy will be limited to creating an enabling environment that is conducive to private investment. 
However, fiscal restraint is likely to conflict with social spending and rural investment creating a 
trade-off between manufacturing growth and more pro-poor growth. 
 
This section has examined three broad avenues of growth in terms of their ability to generate pro-
poor growth. Although returning to a copper-based development strategy does generate higher 
economic growth, it undermines agriculture and effectively isolates the rural population from the 
growth process. Poverty reduction is therefore strongly biased in favor of urban areas. The sector’s 
past performance and the volatility of world commodity markets also raises concerns over the 
long-term sustainability of mining-led growth. While this paper has considered how an upswing in 
world copper markets might benefit growth and poverty-reduction, other research has shown how 
reliance on mining during a sudden downswing could generate an economic crisis in Zambia with 
substantial increases in urban poverty (Lofgren et al., 2002). Mining prospects will ultimately be 
determined by world market conditions and private investment rather than by direct public policy. 
However, Zambia should be cautious when trading-off longer term pro-poor growth from 
economic diversification for short-run growth from windfall gains in the mining sector.  
 
While diversification is essential for long-term growth, severe poverty in both rural and urban 
areas makes identifying the most appropriate avenue for diversification more difficult. Non-
agricultural growth addresses urban poverty but requires a complex policy environment that 
encourages private foreign investment in labor-intensive export sectors. Such efforts will be 
constrained by prevailing inefficiencies within existing enterprises, the lack of appropriately 
skilled labor, and Zambia’s landlocked position. Efforts to attract investment are undermined by 
the government’s flagging commitment to further reforms, especially towards the end of the last 
decade, as well as political and economic uncertainty in neighboring countries. Furthermore, 
li
  46establishing industries with l determine if the benefits 
om manufacturing growth are to extend into rural areas. By contrast, agricultural growth strongly 
 strong backward linkages into rural areas wil
fr
benefits the poorest of Zambia’s households, but does not directly address poverty in urban areas. 
Beyond the ability of government and rural households to raise agricultural productivity, rural 
development under the agriculture-led growth path is contingent on functioning markets, which 
might not exist in remoter rural areas. Establishing market opportunities, especially in foreign 
markets for cash-crops, will ultimately determine the ability of agriculture to generate pro-poor 
growth. While the ultimate growth path adopted by Zambia is likely to be a combination of the 
above three alternatives, the findings have identified the danger of returning to an overemphasis 
on urban-based growth. 
 
  47Section V. Accelerating Pro-Poor Growth 
 
Poverty In Zambia should fall along its current growth path. However, the ability of the poor to 
participate in the growth process remains limited. The unwinding of Dutch Disease, which 
distorted the pattern of production and undermined non-mining exports, should encourage 
agricultural production and benefit rural households. However, agriculture’s response to the 
changing economic environment is contingent on overcoming low productivity and weak market 
access. Urban poverty should also decline, albeit to a lesser extent than in rural areas. Urban 
growth and employment opportunities are constrained by low skills and inadequate private 
investment. Therefore, the ability of rural areas to cope with urban migration will also prove 
portant for achieving pro-poor growth. 
nd 
rban areas. The incidence of poverty suggests that accelerating pro-poor growth in Zambia will 
im
 
Poverty reduction will remain gradual. For instance, under the current growth path the meeting of 
the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of halving poverty will not be achieved until 2040 
(Figure 5.1). Growth-poverty decompositions indicated that poverty-reduction has previously been 
dominated by growth rather than distributional shifts (Table 2.5). Growth-poverty elasticities 
estimate that a growth rate between 7.1 and 8.7 percent would be needed to halve poverty by 
2015.
55 The CGE micro-model finds that an annual growth rate of 8.8 percent would be required 
to meet the MDG.
56 Accelerating pro-poor growth should therefore be the main priority for public 
policy. Previous sections examined the structural trade-offs between agriculture and non-
agriculture-led growth and diversification, and identified a long-standing divide between rural a
u
require policies that address both rural and urban areas. 
 


















































Source: Zambia CGE-micro model results. 
                                                 
55 Since growth-poverty elasticities assume that the distribution of growth remains constant, the differences in the 
required growth rates depend on which survey’s distribution is chosen for the projection. These estimates assume 
population growth of two percent. 
56 The similarity between the growth estimate from 1998 growth-poverty elasticity (8.7) and the CGE model (8.8) is to 
be expected given that the latter is based on this survey. However, growth elasticities assume a constant distribution, 
while the CGE accounts for changes in the between-group distribution (see Agenor et al., 2003).  
  48Addressing Rural Poverty 
 
Two-thirds of Zambia’s poor live in rural areas, with a majority living on small-scale farms. 
Section IV found that agriculture-led growth offers the greatest potential for increasing the 
participation of the poor in the growth process. However, according to Section III, the growth of 
cash-crops during the structural adjustment period mainly benefited medium-scale households in 
specific areas of the country. Furthermore, these crops are relatively capital-intensive and require 
intuitional structures that connect rural producers to urban and foreign markets. Staples crops by 
contrast are grown in different forms throughout the country and directly influence poverty and 
food security. However, both staples and cash-crops are constrained by low productivity and poor 
market access. This section considers the distributional impact of staples and cash-crop-led 
growth, and the importance of market access in generating growth opportunities. 
 
The staples-led growth scenario is similar to the agriculture-led scenario of Section IV except that 
increased productivity is concentrated in the staples sectors.
57 Despite increased production being 
more evenly distributed across rural households and provinces (Figure A5.1), the expansion of 
staples actually leads to an slight increase in rural poverty compared to the broader agriculture-led 
scenario (Figures 4.1 and 5.2).
58 This is because rapidly rising staples production floods the local 
markets leading to declines in prices. While lower food prices benefit urban and rural non-farm 
households, they have a negative effect on those small- and medium-scale households who are 
pite addressing more immediate needs for improved food 
curity, increasing staples production without expanding domestic or foreign markets does not 
reliant on staple-crop income. Des
se
necessarily translate into sustainable long-run poverty-reduction for rural households.  
 
The accessibility of domestic and international markets for rural producers will determine the 
degree to which the fall in domestic staples prices can be cushioned. A second staples scenario 
considers the impact of combining staples-led growth with improved market access.
59 Lowering 
the transaction costs faced by rural staples producers does not translate into a significant additional 
increase in GDP growth. However, there is an increase in the level of real consumption for almost 
all households. There is also a shift in the distribution of the gains from growth (Figure 5.2). 
Poorer small-scale households in the more remote province benefit the most from improved 
market access. The results suggest that market constraints must be considered when attempting to 
reduce poverty through agriculture-led growth. In terms of foreign markets, there is potential for 
Zambia to become a net-exporter of food crops given demand in the region (Diao et al., 2003).  
 
A staples-led growth path is primarily constrained by low farm productivity, which in turn is 
driven by inadequate capital and inputs, and severe labor shortages during planting season. 
Evidence from the successful cassava production in the northern provinces suggest that improved 
farming techniques can help alleviate peak season bottlenecks (Haggblade and Tembo, 2003). 
                                                 
57 Similar to Section IV, TFP growth is increased in the staples sectors to match the five percent aggregate GDP 
growth rate achieved under the copper-led growth path. The same is true for the cash-crop sectors under the cash-
op-led growth scenario. Staples crops include maize, sorghum, millet, groundnuts, wheat, vegetables, rice and 
investment do offset the gains from reduced transaction costs, the results still indicate pro-poor outcomes.  
cr
soybeans. Cash-crops include sugar, cotton, tobacco, and coffee. 
58 Tables A4.1 to A5.2 contain detailed model results.  
59 Market-access is improved by halving the province-specific transactions costs facing rural producers. The market-
access simulations do not incorporate financing considerations. Lofgren et al. (2004) examine in detail the interaction 
between improved market access and the financing of various government road schemes. While the costs of public 
  49Therefore if basic food security is to be achieved then government expenditure on agriculture 
should be expanded to provide regionally-appropriate extension services to rural households. 
However, longer-term staples growth will require sustained public investment in agricultural 
research and private investment in farm capital. The former depends on the government’s 
commitment to agricultural liberalization and diversification, while the latter hinges on the 
provision of microfinance.  
 
Figure 5.2. Growth Incidence Curves for Simulations (2001-2015) 
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Source: Zambia CGE-micro model results. 
 
The cash-crop-led growth scenario considers the impact of concentrating agricultural growth in 
the cash-crop sectors. Although poverty declines, the reduction is substantially lower compared to 
the broader agriculture-led growth scenario (Figures 4.1 and 5.2). The reason for the lower pro-
Improving market access
poor growth is fourfold. First, rural and urban households have low consumption shares of cash-
crops and therefore do not benefit from lower prices in domestic markets. Secondly, since 
medium-scale farm households are more intensive cash-crop producers they are the greatest 
beneficiaries. This can be seen in the flatter growth incidence curve, particularly at the low end of 
the distribution, and the concentration of growth across provinces (Figure A5.2). Thirdly, cash-
crop production is more capital and input intensive, thus creating backward demand into urban 
areas, and making it more difficult for farmers to engage in these crops (World Bank, 2004). 
Finally, increased foreign earnings from cash-crop exports facilitate a higher level of imports, 
which benefit more import-intensive urban-based producers and consumers. 
 
 for cash-crops has a strong additional effect on aggregate GDP growth, 
largely through increased demand for cash-crop exports. The high export-intensity of cash-crops, 
and its relatively weak backward linkage to domestic sectors, creates a dominant export-driven 
sector similar in effect to the copper-led growth scenario. However, unlike mining-led growth, the 
  50sector does progressively distribute the gains from growth, albeit to a lesser extent than under 
staples-led growth. Although improved market access is likely to extend the benefits from cash-
rop expansion, it is unlikely that more remote households will be able to engage in this sector.  
lity of 
ash-crop led growth. As with copper, the reliance on a single export crop raises vulnerability to 
ddressing Urban Poverty 
ined the role of mining, and 
anufacturing and tourism, in generating pro-poor growth.  
 
The urban-biased Dutch Disease created by copper-mining has directly and indirectly been the 
largest contributor to poverty in Zambia over the last three decades. Copper exports crowded-out 
                                                
c
 
Zambia’s own experiences and those of other countries in the region indicate that successful cash-
crop expansion requires substantial investment and appropriate institutions. Cotton in the Eastern 
province of Zambia and in Mali, and horticulture and floriculture in Kenya and Tanzania are prime 
examples. Each case hinged on attracting foreign investment, establishing credit and input supply-
chains, and promoting institutions to represent farmers and provide marketing assistance (Tefft, 
2003; Minot and Ngigi, 2004). The maintenance and acceleration of Zambia’s cash-crop boom 
will therefore depend heavily on attracting private sector investment in agriculture. Private sector 
confidence appears to be growing, especially following the more stable macroeconomic 
environment. However, non-interventionist policies and a demonstrated commitment by the 
government to diversification through agricultural growth will be critical.
60 Furthermore, based on 
the findings of Section IV, the developments taking place in the mining sector, as well as other 
changes in world commodity markets, will ultimately determine the long-term sustainabi
c
negative terms-of-trade effects and may cause sudden reversals in pro-poor growth.  
 
More generally, the ability of agriculture to generate long-term pro-poor growth will hinge on  the 
creation of market opportunities for rural households. Market access has many components, 
including linkages between farmers and consumers, processors and wholesalers, and between rural 
and urban areas. Although trade liberalization has opened new markets for agricultural exports, 
implementing appropriate policies relating to internal markets has proven equally important in 
Africa (Orden et al., 2003). Based on past failures, the government should limit intervention in 
commercial markets, especially in ways that directly distort prices and favor individual crops. 
Rather, government involvement should be aimed at encouraging private investment, and 
addressing the deterioration and lack of infrastructure, which remains a significant constraint to 




Although agricultural growth generates the highest returns for pro-poor growth, the small size of 
the agricultural sector and high levels of urban poverty suggests that accelerating agriculture alone 
will be insufficient for both broad-based and rapid poverty reduction. Furthermore, market 
development – a pre-requisite for long-term sustainable agricultural growth – hinges on 
overcoming supply constraints and finding sufficient demand. Urban growth is critical in 
determining the latter. Beyond its role as a market for agriculture, the urban economy will need to 
provide avenues for diversification away from export-mining and generating employment 
opportunities for the urban poor. This paper has broadly exam
m
 
60 Non-interventionism and a stable policy environment were critical for the success of Kenyan export horticulture 
(Minot and Ngigi, 2003). Cash-crop markets can prove too diverse, fast-changing and risky for state-enterprises and 
marketing boards. 
  51other sectors, concentrated political powe gh economic dependence, made Zambia 
ulnerable to the volatility and long-run downturn of world markets. However, while mining’s 
 contrast, a recovery of the sector through new investment and a more 
uoyant world market might undermine attempts at diversification and stable growth. Maintaining 
er price recovery will be critical (World Bank, 2004).  
 growth strategy. 
s discussed above, improving rural markets, through increased and import-intensive rural 
-labor constraint and encourage labor-intensive manufacturing. Education has also proven 
portant in determining the adoption of new technologies in some agricultural areas (World 
vernment policy. Prevalence is extremely high in urban areas, and threatens 
ll sectors, including health and education provision. Although rural prevalence is lower than in 
rm poverty-reduction, the treatment of the pandemic is likely to require external support.  
he non-agriculture-led growth scenario offers an alternative to agricultural diversification, with 
trong 
ackward linkages into the rural economy, and promoting regional markets should be priorities for 
 reforms that was adopted during the 
ructural adjustment period, while possibly aimed at preventing significant policy-reversals, 
il after macroeconomic stabilization, and together with trade liberalization, 
ndermined privatization. Although private investment has increased in more recent years, the 
form, addressing corruption, and concluding privatization will be critical in establishing 
redibility and transparency.  
een implemented, but further trade-offs will have to be faced if 
e country is to substantially reduce poverty. Although this paper does not outline a 
evelopment. In this regard, agriculture provides the greatest opportunity for accelerating pro-poor 
production and regional trade. However, the road to pro-poor growth will ultimately 
quire policies that address both urban and rural poverty. In this regard the role of the government 
r, and throu
v
past performance has not been positive, the prospects for future growth are uncertain. A complete 
shutdown of the sector, as threatened in 2002, would be devastating for the Zambian economy 
(Lofgren et al., 2002). By
b
broad macroeconomic stability is critical for attracting private investment and encouraging growth 
other non-agricultural sectors. Therefore careful management of foreign exchange earnings and 
revenues from a possible copp
 
The importance of sustained pro-poor spending was revealed during structural adjustment. This is 
one possible means of neutralizing the negative effects on poverty of a copper-led
A
infrastructure investment, would generate pro-poor returns (Lofgren et al., 2004). Other important 
areas of public investment include education and health. The former is necessary to alleviate the 
skilled
im
Bank, 2004). Investment in health, especially in combating the onslaught of HIV/AIDS, must 
remain a priority of go
a
urban areas it could be threatened by urban-rural migration, which would aggravate the existing 




food and textile exports likely to provide the best opportunities. The food and beverage sector is 
already established and is less capital-intensive than minerals-beneficiation. Creating s
b
policy. Textile exports have performed well in recent years, but further expansion is contingent on 
investment (World Bank, 2004). The ‘big-bang’ approach to
st
prevented a more appropriate sequencing of policies. In this regard, private investment was not 
forthcoming unt
u




Substantial reforms have already b
th
comprehensive development strategy for Zambia, it does consider the main sectoral avenues for 
d
growth. Not only do a majority of the poor live in rural areas, but agricultural potential is high 
both for 
re
is limited. Only through good governance can an environment conducive to private sector 
involvement and self-sustaining pro-poor growth be established.  
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Source: Own calculations using Priority Survey (1991) and Living Conditions Monitoring Surveys (1996 and 1998). 
Note: The national growth incidence curve is not strictly decomposable into provincial curves but changes in provincial population shares have been relatively small 
(see Section III). Bottom end of the distribution for both years are dropped (see Appendix B). 
 
  59Table A3.1. Poverty Headcount and Household Distribution by Province and Sector of Employment (1991)
1 
  Poverty headcount  
 Share of provincial employment (Share of sector employment)  
  Agri.  Mining  Manu.  Energy  Const.  Trade  Hotels  Trans.  Finance  Public   Other   All  
Central               
     Poverty  63.6                       
            
                       
 
                       
            
                       
          
                       
   
                       
            
                       
             
                       
            
                       
             
                       
38.0 17.2 26.8 41.5 33.7 34.3 20.6 14.2 19.3 34.7 49.4




5 (9)  2 (7)  10 (9) 
 
3 (6)  100 (9) 
Copperbelt 
     Poverty  55.2 24.8 26.0 27.3 26.0 23.6 10.7 18.9 39.0 17.2 34.4 29.4





















  Eastern 
     Poverty  84.0 - 30.1 - 53.1 29.0 - 30.7 0.0 47.8 37.0 75.3
     Population  81 (21)  0 (0)  1 (3)  0 (2)  1 (5)  5 (11) 
 
0 (5)  1 (3)  1 (5)  7 (11) 
 
2 (5)  100 (15) 
  Luapula 
     Poverty  80.7 - 44.5 42.0 36.5 39.5 9.4 54.3 34.8 25.5 37.1 67.1






1 (7)  2 (5)  1 (7)  9 (10) 
 
2 (5)  100 (11) 
  Lusaka 
     Poverty  47.5 25.0 12.4 5.0 9.9 14.2 7.2 4.9 4.0 5.7 15.5 14.6



















  Northern 
     Poverty  84.1 - 39.4 15.0 46.5 21.8 - 16.9 28.1 23.3 67.2 70.2
     Population  75 (17)  0 (0)  2 (5)  1 (11) 
 
1 (7)  4 (8)  0 (0)  5 (14) 
 
1 (5)  8 (10) 
 
2 (5)  100 (13) 
  North-Western 
     Poverty  83.0 - 23.0 20.1 9.6 58.0 22.3 21.4 - 26.3 31.8 66.9
     Population  71 (7)  0 (1)  3 (2)  1 (3)  4 (7)  3 (3)  1 (3)  1 (1)  0 (0)  14 (7) 
 
2 (2)  100 (5) 
Southern 
     Poverty  78.9 19.7 43.5 25.9 61.6 50.0 41.4 29.1 - 30.9 33.1 66.6
     Population  70 (12)  1 (3)  5 (9)  1 (5)  2 (6)  5 (7)  1 (8)  4 (8)  0 (2)  8 (8)  4 (8)  100 (10) 
  Western 
     Poverty  87.2 - 70.0 32.3 57.3 34.5 18.5 0.0 - 38.9 44.5 77.2
     Population  77 (12)  0 (0)  4 (6)  1 (4)  1 (3)  5 (7)  1 (4)  1 (1)  0 (2)  8 (7)  2 (4)  100 (9) 
Zambia 
     Poverty  79.0 26.1 26.8 25.8 26.5 27.7 15.5 16.7 17.6 22.1 28.6 55.2
     Population  57 (100)  3 (100)  6 (100)  1 (100)  3 (100)  7 (100)  1 (100)  5 (100)  2 (100)  10 (100)  5 (100)  100 (100) 
Source: Own calculations from 1991 PS survey (CSO, 1993). 
1. Sector of employment for households is determined by sector of employment of the household head. Employment includes both formal and informal sectors. 
Notes: Poverty headcounts with low household population shares (less than 0.5 percent of provincial households) can be misleading and have therefore been 
removed. Agri. is agriculture; Manu. is manufacturing; Const. is construction; Trans. is transport; Finance is financial services; Public is public services. 
  60Table A3.2. Poverty Decomposition Across Household Stratum (1991-1998)  

















Rural    
     Small-scale  48.0  -1.6  -25.3 48.0 -3.9  -121.1
     Medium-scale  2.7  0.0  -0.6 2.7 -0.2  -4.6
     Large-scale  0.2  -0.1  -1.0 0.2 -0.1  -2.2
     Non-farm  3.7  0.4  5.7 3.7 0.3  10.1
Urban    
     Low-cost  24.0  2.7  41.8 24.0 2.6  78.9
     Medium-cost  14.9  1.6  24.6 14.9 0.4  11.4
     High-cost  6.5  -0.1  -1.6 6.5 -0.4  -10.9
Within group change    2.8  43.6     -1.3  -38.5
Population shift    4.3  67.1     4.7  144.2
Interaction   -0.7  -10.6     -0.2  -5.7
Total change    6.4  100.0     3.3  100.0




Table A3.3. Poverty Decomposition Across Provinces (1991-1998) 

















Province    
     Central  9.1  0.8  12.9 9.1 0.8  24.0
     Copperbelt  15.0  1.7  26.8 15.0 2.1  63.0
     Eastern  12.8  -0.2  -3.3 12.8 -1.3  -39.9
     Luapula  9.5  0.1  2.1 9.5 0.0  0.6
     Lusaka  16.1  3.8  58.6 16.1 2.8  85.1
     Northern  12.6  0.2  2.6 12.6 -0.3  -9.2
     North-western  5.2  -0.1  -1.4 5.2 -0.3  -7.6
     Southern  11.9  0.0  -0.2 11.9 -0.4  -13.0
     Western  7.8  0.5  7.0 7.8 0.3  9.5
Within group change    6.8  105.1     3.7  112.5
Population shift    -0.4  -6.1     -0.6  -19.1
Interaction   0.1  1.1     0.2  6.6
Total change    6.4  100.0     3.3  100.0
Source: Own calculations using the 1991 PS survey (CSO, 1993) and 1998 LCMS survey (CSO, 1999a). 
 




Note: Stylized mapping of Zambian rail lines and roads. The northern rail line is less developed than and incompatible 
with the southern line. 
 




Source: Own calculations using the 1991 PS survey (CSO, 1993). 
Note: There was a change in the definition of the sampling districts between the Priority Surveys of 1991 and 1993, 
and the LCMS surveys of 1998. Two districts in 1991 were missing. The survey data is not strictly representative at 
the district level and is included here only to give some indication of the finer distribution of poverty. 
 




Source: Own calculations using the 1998 LCMS survey (CSO, 1999b). 
Note:  The survey data is not strictly representative at the district level and is included here only to give some 
indication of the finer distribution of poverty. 
 
 
Table A3.4. Annual Production of Key Agricultural Crops (1990-1999) 
  Annual production (millions of metric tons) 
 Maize  Millet  Sorghum  Cassava 
Ground-
nuts  Sugar Cotton 
1990 1093  32 20 640 25 1127 31
1991 1096  26 21 682 28 1150 49
1992 483  48 13 682 21  1300 26
1993 1598  37 35 744 34 1220 48
1994 1021  63 35 744 35 1311 33
1995 738  55 27 744 36  1310 17
1996 1409  55 36 744 35 1400 41
1997 960  61 31 702 46  1500 80
1998 638  62 25 817 57  1550 105
1999 822  70 25 971 51  1650 140
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAOSTAT, 2003). 
 









































Source: Own calculations using Post-Harvest Crop Surveys (various years). 













































Source: Famine Early Warning System  (FEWS). 
 
  65Table A3.5. HIV/AIDS Prevalence Rates in Zambia (2001) 
  Adult prevalence rate (percent) 
 Male  Female  Total 
National  12.9 17.8 15.6 
Urban  19.2 26.3 23.1 
Rural 8.9  12.4  10.8 
Central  13.4 16.8 15.3 
Copperbelt  17.3 22.1 19.9 
Eastern  11.0 16.1 13.7 
Luapula 8.6  13.3  11.2 
Lusaka  18.7 25.0 22.0 
Northern  6.2 10.0 8.3 
North-Western 9.5  8.8  9.2 
Southern  14.6 20.2 17.6 
Western 8.3  16.9  13.1 




Table A3.6. Governance Indicators (1996-2002)
1
 1996 1998 2000  2002
Voice  and  Accountability      
     Point estimate (-2.5 to 2.5)  -0.15 -0.11 -0.24  -0.4
     Percentile rank  48.2 46.6 43.5  39.4
Political  Stability      
     Point estimate (-2.5 to 2.5)  -0.39 -0.04 -0.48  -0.02
     Percentile rank  27.4 45.5 30.9  44.3
Government  Effectiveness      
     Point estimate (-2.5 to 2.5)  -0.81 -0.39 -0.79  -0.93
     Percentile rank  16.2 38.3 22.3  14.4
Regulatory  Quality      
     Point estimate (-2.5 to 2.5)  0.18 0.32 0.43  -0.6
     Percentile rank  64.1 59.8 65.4  29.9
R u l e   o f   L a w       
     Point estimate (-2.5 to 2.5)  -0.33 -0.34 -0.47  -0.52
     Percentile rank  41.0 41.6 43.8  35.6
Control  of  Corruption     
     Point estimate (-2.5 to 2.5)  -0.91 -0.56 -0.85  -0.97
     Percentile rank  16.0 33.3 20.7  17.0
Source: World Bank Governance Indicators (Kaufman et al., 2004). 
1. Each of the following governance indicators are composites of a series of existing measures reflecting different 
dimensions of each area of governance. The estimates range from –2.5 (bad) to 2.5 (good). For information on the 
calculation of these measures and on their standard errors, see Kaufman et al. (2004). 
  66Table A4.1. Detailed Macroeconomic Results for Simulations, 2001-2015 

























Gross domestic product  12,007  4.0 5.0 5.0 5.0  5.0  5.1 5.0 5.6
     Private consumption  10,864  2.9 5.9 3.9 3.7  3.9  4.4 3.7 4.5
     Investment  2,634  2.2 8.1 3.7 3.6  3.5  4.2 4.7 6.1
     Government  1,709  3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5  3.5  3.5 3.5 3.5
     Agriculture  2,963  4.6 3.3 7.7 4.2  7.8  8.1 7.1 8.6
          Staples  2,709  4.1 3.7 7.3 4.0  8.0  8.4 4.0 3.4
          Cash-crops  168  10.2 -7.2 13.4 7.1  7.0  3.5 22.8 27.2
     Industry  3,276  3.6 6.3 3.4 4.5  3.4  3.6 3.3 3.6
          Mining  1,325  1.9 8.6 1.9 1.9  1.9  1.9 1.9 1.9
          Manufacturing  1,951  4.5 4.2 4.3 5.8  4.3  4.7 4.2 4.6
     Services  5,768  3.9 4.9 4.1 5.6  4.0  4.0 4.7 4.7
Real exchange rate
   
 
 
0.9 -3.5 -0.2 0.1  -0.1  -0.4 -1.3 -1.9
Exports 3,804  5.5 6.2 6.5 7.1  6.4  6.8 7.5 9.9
   Agriculture  368  11.3 -12.5 18.8 6.8  18.4  19.9 22.2 26.9
       Staples  122  10.7 -10.8 22.9 5.4  26.1  28.9 -0.8 -5.5
       Cash-crops  244  11.6 -13.5 15.7 7.4  8.4  3.8 25.7 30.6
    Industry  3,070  3.9 7.6 2.6 4.3  2.8  2.5 1.6 1.1
       Mining  2,501  1.3 9.1 1.2 0.8  1.2  1.2 1.2 1.0
       Manufacturing  394  10.1 -14.0 6.3 13.1  6.8  6.1 3.2 1.5
    Services  366  8.5 -5.2 3.9 17.6  4.2  3.4 2.1 1.1
Imports 5,860  2.6 8.5 3.5 3.7  3.4  3.9 4.5 6.3
   Agriculture  416  0.3 11.9 -4.0 3.4  -2.4  -0.7 3.0 12.7
       Staples  292  -0.4 13.0 -7.0 2.9  -7.2  -6.4 4.5 14.2
       Cash-crops  116  1.6 7.4 0.8 4.4  3.6  5.6 -3.3 6.5
    Industry  4,887  2.8 8.3 3.8 3.7  3.7  4.2 4.6 5.6
       Mining  76  3.1 10.5 1.3 5.0  1.6  1.6 0.1 0.3
       Manufacturing  4,812  2.8 8.2 3.8 3.7  3.7  4.2 4.6 5.6
    Services  557  2.9 7.8 4.0 4.0  3.8  3.9 5.1 5.5
Source: Zambia CGE-micro model results. 
  67Table A4.2. Sectoral Shares for Simulations, 2001-2015 

























Gross domestic product  100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0
     Agriculture  24.7  26.7 19.8 35.2 22.3  35.9  36.5 32.5 36.4
          Staples  22.6  22.9 18.9 30.4 19.7  33.4  34.7 19.5 16.9
          Cash-crops  1.4  3.1 0.2 4.1 1.9  1.8  1.1 12.4 18.9
     Industry  27.3  25.8 32.4 22.0 25.5  22.1  22.4 21.7 20.8
          Mining  11.0  8.3 17.8 7.2 7.3  7.3  7.1 7.2 6.7
          Manufacturing  16.2  17.4 14.6 14.8 18.2  14.8  15.2 14.5 14.2




100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0
   Agriculture  9.7  20.4 0.7 45.1 9.2  43.1  48.8 58.6 72.1
       Staples  3.2  6.3 0.3 24.1 2.6  34.6  44.4 1.1 0.4
       Cash-crops  6.4  14.1 0.4 20.7 6.6  8.3  4.3 57.5
    Industry  80.7  65.3 97.4 48.0 55.4  49.7  45.1 36.7 25.0
       Mining  65.8  37.0 96.7 32.6 27.9  32.9  30.7 28.2 20.3
       Manufacturing  10.4  18.9 0.5 10.2 22.0  10.9  9.4 5.8 3.4
    Services  9.6  14.3 2.0 6.9 35.4  7.2  6.1 4.7 3.0
Imports 100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0
   Agriculture  7.1  5.1 10.8 2.5 6.8  3.2  3.8 5.8 16.0
       Staples  5.0  3.3 8.8 1.1 4.5  1.1  1.2 5.0 13.6
       Cash-crops  2.0  1.7 1.7 1.4 2.2  2.0  2.5 0.7 2.0
    Industry  83.4  85.1 80.5 87.3 83.3  86.8  86.7 83.9 75.5
       Mining  1.3  1.4 1.7 1.0 1.5  1.0  0.9 0.7 0.6
       Manufacturing  82.1  83.7 78.9 86.3 81.8  85.8  85.8 83.2 75.0
    Services  9.5  9.8 8.6 10.3 9.9  10.0  9.5 10.3 8.5
Source: Zambia CGE-micro model results. 
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Poverty headcount (P0)  75.4  68.3 56.6 59.4 63.9  59.5  54.5 62.0 55.8
     Rural  85.6  78.4 74.7 68.1 76.4  68.1  61.2 72.3 64.2
          Small-scale  86.4  79.0 76.5 68.1 77.2  68.0  60.4 73.0 64.4
          Medium-scale  80.3  69.5 63.3 56.3 65.2  59.0  54.5 55.9 45.1
          Non-farm  80.9  78.0 61.3 74.8 74.4  75.5  74.0 74.5 72.8
     Urban  58.3  51.4 26.5 45.0 42.9  45.2  43.3 44.8 41.8
          Low-cost  64.3  56.2 32.2 48.9 46.4  49.0  47.1 48.1 44.9
          Medium-cost  50.1  47.1 12.6 43.6 41.9  44.1  41.9 45.4 42.3
          High-cost  33.0  28.7 8.9 24.5 24.1  24.6  23.3 25.5 23.6
     Province                            
          Central  78.9  73.8 60.5 66.4 70.1  66.5  64.2 67.7 61.9
          Copperbelt  67.0  61.6 39.5 55.9 54.5  56.1  54.1 56.2 52.1
          Eastern  82.6  67.1 70.0 56.0 68.3  62.5  58.1 51.0 36.7
          Luapula  85.4  79.2 67.9 68.4 76.1  65.8  61.8 74.1 68.4
          Lusaka  54.4  45.5 28.0 40.3 36.3  40.2  39.1 40.7 39.1
          Northern  85.0  79.7 70.1 65.9 76.5  62.5  55.1 75.8 70.9
          North-western  76.0  71.1 62.4 54.2 67.5  52.6  47.9 66.5 61.3
          Southern  78.4  72.7 63.8 65.6 68.4  65.6  58.9 68.0 59.2
          Western  90.3  87.3 78.4 77.9 83.9  76.6  56.7 83.3 78.0
Poverty severity (P2)  25.6  20.4 15.9 15.1 18.3  15.0  12.5 16.8 13.5
     Rural  33.3  26.5 23.0 19.2 24.7  19.1  15.4 21.9 17.2
          Small-scale  33.7  26.6 23.7 18.7 24.9  18.5  14.6 21.9 16.9
          Medium-scale  27.7  21.1 18.6 15.5 19.6  15.9  12.9 16.1 11.3
          Non-farm  32.2  29.3 17.6 26.4 25.7  27.0  25.8 26.0 24.6
     Urban  12.6  10.2 4.0 8.2 7.7  8.3  7.7 8.2 7.3
          Low-cost  14.9  11.8 4.9 9.3 8.7  9.4  8.8 9.1 8.1
          Medium-cost  8.3  7.6 1.9 6.7 6.3  6.7  6.2 7.1 6.4
          High-cost  4.8  4.3 0.9 3.5 3.4  3.5  3.2 3.9 3.3
Source: Zambia CGE-micro model results. 
1. The initial poverty rates in 2001 are the same as those 1998 (see Table 2.2) since the 2002 household survey containing information on poverty and distribution 
was not yet available. 
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  Average annual pro-poor growth rate (%) 
            1991-98 2001-15 2001-15        2001-15 2001-15 2001-15 2001-15 2001-15 2001-15






















Upper poverty line     
     National  1.1  1.3 2.9 2.9 2.0  2.9  3.7 2.4 3.4
     Rural  4.0  1.5 2.4 3.4 2.0  3.4  4.5 2.7 4.1
     Urban  -1.8  0.8 4.2 1.7 1.9  1.6  1.9 1.7 2.1
     Central  -2.3  1.1 2.9 2.5 1.6  2.5  3.0 2.1 3.3
     Copperbelt  -3.5  0.9 3.8 1.8 1.9  1.8  2.0 1.7 2.3
     Eastern  5.7  2.5 2.0 4.4 2.2  3.6  4.2 5.2 7.6
     Luapula  2.4  1.4 3.0 3.3 2.0  3.6  4.4 2.2 3.3
     Lusaka  -4.2  1.1 3.6 2.0 2.4  2.0  2.2 1.8 2.2
     Northern  4.1  1.3 2.7 3.5 1.9  3.9  4.9 2.0 2.9
     North-western  2.6  1.2 2.5 3.5 1.8  3.9  4.4 2.0 2.9
     Southern  1.3  1.3 2.6 2.6 2.0  2.6  3.8 2.3 3.8
     Western  1.1  1.1 2.4 2.8 1.6  3.0  6.2 1.8 2.7
Source: Zambia CGE-micro model results; own calculations using Priority Survey (1991) and Living Conditions Monitoring Survey (1998) for 1991-1998. 
1. The initial poverty rates in 2001 are the same as those 1998 (see Table 2.2) since the 2002 household survey was not yet available. 
 





















































Source: Zambia CGE-micro model results 
 






















































Source: Zambia CGE-micro model results 
 























































Source: Zambia CGE-micro model results 
 



















































Source: Zambia CGE-micro model results 
  74Table A5.1. Growth Decomposition for Simulations 














GDP at factor cost  5.0 5.0 5.1 5.0  5.6
     Physical capital
  1.4 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7
     Human capital  0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8  0.8
     Total factor productivity  2.8 2.8 2.8 2.7  3.1
GDP at factor cost  5.0 5.0 5.1 5.0  5.6
     Agriculture  2.3 2.4 2.7 2.2  3.1
     Mining  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1  0.1
     Manufacturing  0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6  0.6
     Services  1.9 1.8 1.7 2.2  1.8
Source: Zambia CGE-micro model results. 
1. Simulation results from Table 4.1. 
 
 
Table A5.2. Poverty Changes for Simulations (Upper Poverty Line) 














Headcount (P0)  59.4 59.5 54.4 62.0  55.8
     Rural  68.0 68.1 61.1 72.3  64.2
          Small-scale  68.1 68.0 60.4 73.0  64.5
          Medium-scale  56.3 59.0 54.5 55.9  45.1
     Urban  45.0 45.2 43.3 44.8  41.8
Squared poverty gap (P2)  15.1 15.0 12.5 16.8  13.5
     Rural  19.2 19.1 15.4 22.0  17.2
          Small-scale  18.7 18.5 14.6 21.9  16.9
          Medium-scale  15.5 15.9 12.8 16.1  11.3
     Urban  8.2 8.3 7.7 8.2  7.3
Source: Zambia CGE-micro model results. 
1. Simulation results from Table 4.1. 
 
 






















































Source: Zambia CGE-micro model results 





















































Source: Zambia CGE-micro model results 
 




Three nationally representative household surveys (1991, 1996 and 1998) were used for the 
poverty and inequality analysis. McCulloch et al. (2001) describe the cleaning of the surveys in 
detail. A brief summary is provided here. The first survey is the 1991 Priority Survey (PS) (CSO, 
1993), which was conducted between October and November and included information on 
household income and cash expenditures for a sample of 9,886 households. The 1991 PS failed to 
capture information on home produced consumption. Although the 1991 PS is representative at 
the provincial level (using the 1990 census), it did exclude a number of districts. The second and 
third surveys were the 1996 and 1998 Living Conditions Monitoring Surveys (LCMS). These 
surveys covered additional questions regarding migration and access to facilities. The 1996 LCMS 
sampled 11,752 households, again representative at the provincial level, but covering all districts 
based on a revised classification. The larger 1998 LCMS effectively sampled 16,800 households 
between November and December. Stratification in rural areas was based on farm scale and non-





Household consumption expenditure was the chosen welfare indicator. McCulloch et al. (2001) 
describe in detail the calculation of the per capita adult equivalent consumption measure used in 
this study. The measure included household spending on food, education, health, clothing, housing 
and transport. Amongst other items, the expenditure measure excluded alcohol, entertainment and 
cigarettes. The 1991 did not account for home produced consumption, but rather imputed a value 
for each household, which is included in the expenditure measure used in this study. As described 
in McCulloch et al. (2001), the bottom end of the consumption distribution for the 1991 PS shows 




Upper and lower national poverty lines were computed by McCulloch et al. (2001). These were 
set at K46,286 and K32,232 per adult equivalent per month in 1998 prices, and correspond to the 
official basic needs (moderate) and food (extreme) poverty lines. The lower poverty line satisfies 
nutritional requirements (corresponds to US$0.50 per day). The upper poverty line adds another 
30 percent for basic non-food needs (corresponds to US$0.78 per day). The US$1 per day per 
capita (PPP) poverty line, which is useful for international  comparison, produces extremely high 
poverty rates (above 90 percent) and is therefore not useful for our purposes. 
 
Pro-Poor Growth  
 
The growth process is defined as ‘pro-poor’ if and only if poor people benefit in absolute terms 
(Ravallion, 2004; Ravallion and Chen, 2003). Based on this absolute definition of pro-poor 
growth, the pro-poor growth rate is the average annual growth rate of real per capita consumption 
between two periods for each percentile of the population falling below the poverty line. In other 
words, it is the mean consumption growth rate of the poor, which can be derived from the growth 
incidence curves.  
  78Growth Incidence Curves 
 
The growth incidence curve indicates the average annual real consumption growth for each 
percentile of the population ranked according to per capita consumption (Ravallion and Chen, 
2003). As already described above, the differences in design and methodology of the 1991, 1996 
and 1998 surveys lead to unreliable consumption changes at the very bottom end of the 
distribution. The annual growth rates for the very poor appear to be implausibly high due to very 
low food expenditure in 1991, thus making the growth incidence curves steeply downward 
sloping.  Accordingly, a cut-off point (ten percent of the lower poverty line) is arbitrarily adopted 
for the consumption measure. The growth incidence curves and pro-poor growth rates therefore do 
not include households that reported total adult equivalent per capita consumption of less than ten 
percent of the lower poverty line. Poverty and inequality measures shown other than the pro-poor 
growth rate and growth incidence curve do not have this cut-off. The number and share of 
individuals eliminated from the 1991 survey are shown in Table B1. Although not shown, the 
households eliminated from the 1991 survey broadly match the stratification and distribution of 
the households eliminated from the 1996 and 1998 households and therefore does not greatly 
effect the decomposition of pro-poor growth across provinces and strata.  
 
Table B1. Household Eliminated from the 1991 Priority Survey 
Number of People  
  Original Eliminated
Percentage 
eliminated
National 7,636,990 584,685 7.7
     Rural   4,171,814 572,452 13.7
          Small-scale  3,667,405 528,679 14.4
          Medium-scale  205,948 18,705 9.1
          Large-scale  17,598 639 3.6
          Non-farm  280,863 24,429 8.7
     Urban  3,465,176 12,233 0.4
          Low-cost  1,835,440 5,626 0.3
          Medium-cost  1,135,274 4,276 0.4
          High-cost  494,462 2,331 0.5
Source: Own calculations using Priority Survey (1991) and Living Conditions Monitoring Surveys (1996 and 1998). 
 
 
  79Appendix C: The Macro-Micro Model 
 
The poverty and distributional impact of alternative development strategies is modeled using a 
extended regional version of the 2001 recursive dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model described in Lofgren et al. (2004).
61 This class of model developed from the neoclassical-
structuralist modeling originally tradition presented in Dervis, de Melo and Robinson (1982). The 
results from the economy-wide CGE model are passed down to the micro-level household survey. 
 
CGE Model Specification 
 
In accordance with the Zambian social accounting matrix (SAM), the model distinguishes between 
243 productive activities (27 sectors in nine provinces) and the 27 commodities that they 
produce.
62 While production is generated within provinces, commodities are bought and sold on 
national markets. The model identifies 48 factors of production: 36 types of labor (male/female, 
low/high-educated, and by province); land (by province) and three types of capital (agricultural, 
mining, and other). Producers in the model make decisions in order to maximize profits, with the 
choice between province-specific factors being governed by a constant elasticity of substitution 
(CES) function. Once determined, these factors are combined under a fixed-share Leontief 
specification. Profit maximization implies that the factors receive income where marginal revenue 
equals marginal cost based on endogenous relative prices. 
 
Substitution possibilities also exist between production for the domestic and the foreign markets. 
This decision of producers is governed by a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function 
which distinguishes between exported and domestic goods, and by doing so, captures any time or 
quality differences between the two products. Profit maximization drives producers to sell in those 
markets where they can achieve the highest returns. These returns are based on domestic and 
export prices (where the latter is determined by the world price times the exchange rate adjusted 
for any taxes). Under the small-country assumption, Zambia is assumed to face a perfectly elastic 
world demand at fixed world prices. The final ratio of exports to domestic goods is determined by 
the endogenous interaction of relative prices for these two commodity types. 
 
Further substitution possibilities exist between imported and domestic goods under a CES 
Armington specification. Such substitution can take place both in final and intermediates usage. 
The Armington elasticities vary across sectors, with lower elasticities reflecting greater differences 
between domestic and imported goods. Again under the small country assumption, South Africa is 
assumed to face infinitely elastic world supply at fixed world prices. The final ratio of imports to 
domestic goods is determined by the cost minimizing decision-making of domestic demanders 
based on the relative prices of imports and domestic goods (both of which include relevant taxes).  
The model distinguishes between various ‘institutions’ within the Zambian economy, including 
enterprises, the government, and 63 types of households. The household categories are 
                                                 
61 A detailed description of the workings of the model can be found in Lofgren et al. (2001) and Thurlow (2003), 
while a generic version of the model is presented in Robinson and Thurlow (forthcoming). Although the regionalized 
SAM has not yet been documented, a national version of the SAM is described in Evans, Robinson and Thurlow 
(2004). 
62 The actual number of activities in the model differs since certain sectors are not present in all provinces (the actual 
total in 2001 is 232 activities). 
  80disaggregated across provinces and according to economic stratum.
63 Households and enterprises 
receive income in payment for producers’ use of their factors of production. Both institutions pay 
direct taxes to government (based on fixed tax rates), save (based on marginal propensities to 
save), and make transfers to the rest of the world. Enterprises pay their remaining income to 
households in the form of dividends. Households, unlike enterprises, use their income to consume 
commodities under a linear expenditure system (LES) of demand.  
 
The government receives income from imposing activity, sales and direct taxes and import tariffs, 
and then makes transfers to households, enterprises and the rest of the world. The government also 
purchases commodities in the form of government consumption expenditure, and the remaining 
income of government is (dis)saved. All savings from households, enterprises, government and the 
rest of the world (foreign savings) are collected in a savings pool from which investment is 
financed. 
 
Macro Adjustment Rules 
 
The model includes three broad macroeconomic accounts: (i) the savings and investment account; 
(ii) the current account, and (iii) the government balance. In order to bring about balance between 
the various macro accounts, it is necessary to specify a set of ‘macroclosure’ rules, which provide 
a mechanism through which macroeconomic balance can be achieved.  
 
(i) A savings-driven closure was assumed in order to balance the Zambian savings-investment 
account. Under this closure, real investment quantities are fixed, and the marginal propensities to 




(ii) For the current account it was assumed that a flexible exchange rate adjusts in order to 
maintain a fixed level of foreign savings. In other words, the external balance is held fixed in 
foreign currency indicating the government is not able to borrow in order to cover additional 
expenditure. Finally, the domestic price index was chosen as the numéraire.  
 
(iii) In the government account the level of direct and indirect tax rates, as well as real government 
consumption expenditure, are held constant. As such the balance on the government budget is 
assumed to adjust to ensure that public expenditures equal receipts.  
 
On the microeconomic side, firms are assumed always to be on their factor demand curves. In the 
Zambian model it was assumed that all land and labor is fully employed and hence is paid a 
flexible real rental rate or wage under the condition of fixed supply. Capital is constrained to be 
sector-specific and earning flexible activity-specific returns. 
 
CGE Model Dynamics 
 
In order to account for the full ‘dynamic’ effect of policy and non-policy changes, the static model 
described above is extended to a recursive dynamic model in which selected parameters are 
                                                 
63 Stratum include rural small, medium and large-scale farmers; rural non-farm households; and urban low, medium, 
and high cost areas (defined according cost-of-living).  
64 There is no explicit specification of the financial sector in the CGE model. 
  81updated based on the modeling of inter-temporal behavior and results from previous periods. 
Current economic conditions, such as the availability of capital, are endogenously dependent on 
past outcomes but remain unaffected by forward-looking expectations. The dynamic model is also 
exogenously updated to reflect demographic and technological changes that are based on observed 
or separately calculated projected trends. Most of these time-trends are taken from the World 
Bank’s Zambian Revised Minimum Standards Model (RMSM) as described in detail in Lofgren et 
al. (2004). 
 
The process of capital accumulation is modeled endogenously, with previous-period investment 
generating new capital stock for the subsequent period. Although the allocation of new capital 
across sectors is influenced by each sector’s initial share of aggregate capital income, the final 
sectoral allocation of capital in the current period is dependent on the capital depreciation rate and 
on sectoral profit-rate differentials from the previous period. Sectors with above-average capital 
returns receive a larger share of the new capital stock than their current share in capital income. 
The converse is true for sectors where capital returns are below-average.  
 
Population growth is exogenously imposed on the model based on separately calculated growth 
projections. It is assumed that a growing population generates a higher level of consumption 
demand and therefore raises the supernumerary income level of household consumption within the 
LES demand system. Both labor supply and total factor productivity (TFP) growth are updated 
exogenously based on AIDS-adjusted estimates (see Lofgren et al., 2004). Finally, mining 
production is assumed to be predominantly driven by a combination of changes in world demand 
and prices, and other factors external to the model. Accordingly, GDP growth in these sectors and 
in the world price of exports are updated exogenously between periods based on detailed sector-
level projections (World Bank, 2004).  
 
The dynamic model is solved as a series of equilibria each one representing a single year. By 
imposing the above policy-independent dynamic adjustments, the model produces a projected or 
counterfactual growth path. Policy changes can then be expressed in terms of changes in relevant 
exogenous parameters and the model is re-solved for a new series of equilibriums. Differences 
between the policy-influenced growth path and that of the counterfactual can then be interpreted as 




The poverty and distributional impact of policy changes are modeled inside the same 1998 LCMS 
household survey that was used to construct the CGE model. Each representative household in the 
CGE model is linked to its corresponding household within the survey. The use of ‘representative’ 
households in the model is identical to the use of sample weights in surveys. Each household is an 
average representative of a larger number of households within the greater population. Since 
poverty in this study is defined according to per capita expenditure, changes in household 
expenditure from the CGE model are passed down to the survey, where poverty and inequality are 
calculated (see Appendix A). 
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